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Today, the works o f late nineteenth-century philosopher Friedrich
Nietzsche remain some of the world's best-known. Y et at one time,
Nietzsche's fame came tragically close to infamy. After Nietzsche
went insane in 1890, his ideas became closely associated with
Europe's rising Wave o f militarism. That same militarism ended in
the hitherto unparalleled carnage of W orld W ar I. A t that time,
Nietzsche's ideals were widely affiliated with the cause of the war.
After W orld W ar I, Europe's most militaristic veterans formed the
rank-and-file of the new fascist parties. For many, the Great War
had only intensified the "Nietzschean" idea that life was best
embodied through violence. Fascists all over Europe espoused
Nietzsche's warrior ethic. Through Nazism, the most intensified
form of fascism, the separation o f the races was advocated to create
an atmosphere o f eternal tribalistic struggle and militaristic glory.
Nazis viewed racial dominance as the ultimate virtue. As the
militarists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had
done, the Nazis bore the torch of Nietzsche's legacy, and claimed
him as their consummate ideological forebear.
As World W ar II ended, the Nazi association with Nietzsche had to
be clarified. Either Nietzsche had to be dismissed with the other
ideological foundations of Nazism, or Nietzsche had somehow to be
rescued. W alter Kaufmann went to great lengths to ensure that
Nietzsche would no longer be associated with his militaristic
advocates, especially the Nazis. Kaufmann rescued Nietzsche, but the
reception of Nietzsche's works has been skewed ever since. In order
to make Nietzsche palatable in the post-totalitarian West, the
militaristic, hierarchical, and quasi-racist ideas that Nietzsche
presented in his works have been systematically ignored. For better
or worse, the "true" Nietzsche had more in common with the
twentieth century radical right than the post-war portrayal of him
has shown. The potential politicized nature of a debate on the topic
has virtually prevented a debate altogether. This thesis compares the
textual works o f Nietzsche with that of the Nazis in order to explore
where they in fact do and do not share common ideological ground.
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ABBREVIATIONS FOR NIETZSCHE’S WORKS

The Antichrist (ATC)1
Beyond Good and Evil (BGE)
The Birth of Tragedy (BT)2
The Case of Wagner (CW )3
Ecce Homo (EH)4
The Gay Science (GSC)
The Geneology of Morals (GM )5
Nietzsche Contra W agner (NCW )6
Twilight of the Idols (TW I)7
The Will to Power (WP)
Thus Spake Zarathustra (ZAR)8

1Taken
2Taken
3Taken
4Taken
5Taken
6Taken
7Taken
8Taken

from The Portable Nietzsche
from The Birth of Tragedy and The Geneology of Morals
from On the Genology of Morals and Ecce Homo (and other works)
from On the Genology of Morals and Ecce Homo (and other works)
From The Birth of Tragedy and The Geneology of Morals
from The Portable Nietzsche
from The Portable Nietzsche
from The Portable Nietzsche

Chapter I:
Nietzsche, the Nazis, & the Nietzsehe-Nazi Debate
One day, my name will be associated with the memory
of something tremendous - a crisis without equal on
earth, the most profound collision o f conscience, a
decision that was conjured up against everything that
had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. I am no
man, I am dynamite. -- Friedrich Nietzsche (EH 110).
Not until after Nietzsche went insane, in 1890, did the Western
intellectual world take widespread notice of his tragic insights. No
thinker has observed more fatal flaws in Western Culture than
Nietzsche, and no thinker has been more detailed in his description
of the perceived decline of the West. During the ten years of
insanity preceding Nietzsche's death, a "Nietzsche cult" emerged
among the intellectual elite of Europe. Nietzscheans used his works
to spearhead a movement advocating an end to Western Culture as it
had hitherto existed. Bourgeois morality, technological life,
Christianity, and "progress" were attacked by those who would do
Nietzsche's bidding during his time of decline.
As Nietzsche's popularity grew exponentially throughout the
1890's, the implications of his thought became a focal point in
European intellectual life. Nietzsche had witnessed modem man
slowly but undeniably drifting into a repugnantly contented
existence, and this conviction led him to some radical conclusions.
In place of the placated "herd animal man," Nietzsche advocated a
renewed spirituality based on man's more primal predatory instincts.
For Nietzsche, the predatory drives of a Napoleon or an Alexander
were noble, and therefore superior to the placid herd impulses o f a
sheep or a slave. If a man does not own-up to his instinct for
conquering others, Nietzsche thought, his existence could not be
complete. The increased advocacy of Nietzsche's "warrior ethic"
resulted in the escalation of militarism as a state of mind. Nietzsche
had followers all over Europe, but in Germany, his cultural impact
was remarkable even before his death in 1900.
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Nietzsche's philosophy undoubtedly contributed to the build-up
leading to W orld W ar I. To many Europeans who read his work,
Nietzsche wished to end a century of pacifism and effeminacy with a
dazzling display of courage, camaraderie, and conquest. As
demonstrated in Fritz Stem 's Politics o f Cultural Despair, thinkers
such as Georges Sorel, Paul de Lagarde, and Arthur M oeller van den
Bruck converted Nietzsche's ideas into the literal advocacy of
violence, blood-lust, and nationalistic militarism. As resistance to
Europe's military build-up waned, Nietzsche's legacy conspicuously
grew in kind.
As World W ar I began, German soldiers marched to the
trenches with a copy o f the Bible in one coat pocket, and a copy of
Thus Spake Zarathustra in the other.1 As the war ended, those who
continued to advocate militarism in Germany, notably the National
Socialists, also proclaimed Nietzsche as their prime intellectual
forebear. Before and during World War II, most people, intellectual
or not, accepted Nietzsche as a natural fit with the rest of the Nazi
ideological pantheon. As World War II ended, most people equated
the Nazis' atrocities with the essence of their ideology. After the
war, Nietzsche's works had to be salvaged from their association
with a movement perceived to have no value. W est of the Iron
Curtain, those who wished to extinguish the ideological connection
between Nietzsche and the Nazis found no opposition.
The results of Nietzsche's post-war banishment from the Nazi
ideological pantheon have been mixed. We still read Nietzsche.
Were his reputation as a proto-Nazi never systematically
undermined, Nietzsche's reception around the world might have been
damaged to the point of universal dismissal. On the other hand,
explaining how the crass and clumsy Nazis were ever able to make
use of the elegant and articulate Nietzsche is a task that remains
conspicuously avoided. If Nietzsche were so brilliant and wise, and
. the Nazis so ignorant and transparent, what person o f sound mind
could have ever contemplated their intellectual union in the first

1H.L. Mencken, The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (New York: Kennikat
Press, 1967), 11.
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place? In The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990 (1992),
Steven Aschheim addresses this very issue, and proposes to
deal with the most straightforward and yet strangely
underexamined empirical dimension of the relationship:
locating and analyzing the ways in which Nietzsche was
integrated into or banished from Nazi discourse, and the
various functions of Nietzscheanism fulfilled within the
Reich. . . . The internal strategies involved in this
transmutation and the extent of its diffusion have to date
still not been systematically analyzed.2
Textual comparisons between Nietzsche and the Nazis remain
unwritten as well. For Aschheim, Nietzsche served as a natural and
vital ideological source for Nazi philosophy. Ignorance of this fact
can be attributed to the political aberration of the post-war academic
world. Aschheim addresses the literal use of Nietzsche by the Nazis,
as well as the Nazis' willful ignorance of his not-so-useful ideas.
This essay will address the same issue, but from a different vantage
point. While Aschheim documents specific instances of the Nazis'
use and misuse of Nietzsche, this essay will base its comparison on
textual evidence to discern exactly where the ideologies do, and do
not share ground. Aschheim has documented the results of
Nietzsche's incorporation into the Nazi pantheon. This essay will
focus more on the spirits of the two philosophies as presented
through text. In the estimation of this author, only through such
textual comparisons can arty honest debate be conducted regarding
whether or not Nietzsche was misappropriated by the National
Socialists. To set a context for how such a debate might be carried
out, it will first be useful to examine the historical intellectual
treatment of the supposed Nietzsche-Nazi link. In order to provide

2Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992), 233.
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an initial context even for this discussion, a synopsis of Nietzsche's
and the Nazis' ideologies is first in order.
A Brief Look at the Nietzschean Philosophy
It must be said that there is no "one" Nietzschean perspective.
Yet if a summation of Nietzsche's ideology is possible, it might read
something like this: "Mankind must make it his goal to become more
than man, he must become Superman. But first, he must relearn
what it means to be man." W ithout question, Nietzsche mainly
concerned himself with the quality of the individual's existence. His
insistence that the modem world had less to offer anyone's existence
than did periods of antiquity channelled his mind into an anomalous,
though somewhat Romantic direction. Like the Romantics, Nietzsche
prescribed a harkening-back to past values. Yet Nietzsche's call for
a future transcendence of all human conditions, and his demand for
immediate authenticity, set him apart from the Romantic movement.
Nietzsche understood the impossibility of replicating the culture of
the ancient Greeks. Since the Greeks, though, no culture had
succeeded in balancing what Nietzsche called the Apollonian and
Dionysian impulses which define the natural instincts of man.
W ithout adherence to these natural instincts, all existence is
incomplete, or worse, decadent. Cultures only progress in
proportion to their ability to balance the Apollonian (instinct for
order) and Dionysian (instinct for chaos) motives. As cultures favor
the Dionysian, they become increasingly barbaric. As they favor the
Apollonian, they become increasingly civilized and then overly
civilized. In either case, as the existences of those within such
cultures become increasingly imbalanced in one direction or the
other, the cultures literally become increasingly decadent. Since
Nietzsche believed that Western Culture had become ridiculously
lop-sided toward the Apollonian instinct, he believed that the West
had come to epitomize a culture in decline. Hence, all notions of
progress in W estern Culture are patent illusions.
For Nietzsche, Western regression began with the Socratic
turn. Before Socrates, the Greeks did not question life. They were
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civilized enough to live in ordered cities, but barbaric enough to
summarily make war upon each other, own other humans without
compunction, and accept life as a tragedy in which "improvement"
and ordering were foreign concepts. The Greeks' governments and
art set them apart from the barbaric hordes which surrounded them,
but as the compulsion for "improvement" set in, the ancient Greeks
became more like domesticated herd animals in which violence must
be justified, and less like beasts of prey in which violence is an
unquestioned and natural instinct of life. Through Socratic logic and
questioning, all that did not "make sense" in Greek culture began to
be rooted out. The Greeks lost their predatory instinct for hierarchy
and domination, and turned instead to democratic "inclusiveness."
Their acceptance of life as myth increasingly gave way to scientific
explanation. A t the same time, they traded a healthy love of war and
honor for the bloodbath of the Peloponnesian War. With these
cultural capitulations, the Greeks became at once too civilized and
too barbaric. For Nietzsche, the individual existence can only be
realized in a vital culture. Civilization and barbarism to excess are
equally the enemies of culture. More than any other people, the
ancient Greeks have come closest to the perfect balance of
civilization and barbarism, finding Aristotle's golden mean in the
middle.
Nietzsche maintained that Socratic reason had combined with
Christianity to form the deadliest of cultural toxins. Germanic and
Celtic Europe had been excessively barbaric before Christianity, but
the philosophies of Socrates and Christ anesthetized the vital instincts
of Europe's peoples to a degree without equal in history.
Christianity, through its universalism and credo of "love thy
neighbor," robbed Europe of its distinctive cultural identity. Europe
went straight from the decadence of animal brutality to the
decadence of a satisfied, neutered herd. For Nietzsche, the Middle
Ages were characterized not by the Dionysian-Apollonian balance,
but rather by a sickening mix of extremes o f the two. Christendom
existed as a distasteful combination of Pagan-Germanic barbarism,
and dogmatic adherence to a slavish ethic which Europeans only
vaguely understood. In contemporary times, the French Revolution
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has served as a catalyst for the dominance of these herd values,
though in a secular context. For Nietzsche, exempting a brief period
during the Renaissance, Europe has come ever-further from finding
true "Kultur."
Now, with every step taken closer to the perfection of the
"herd politics" o f democracy, the "herd morality" of Christianity,
and the "herd ethic" of pacifism, Europe takes one step further from
culture. Even in Nietzsche's day, this could be seen in the increasing
aversion to hierarchical institutions in society, the increased primacy
of mass culture, the decadence and lack of focus in art, the
demonization of the great man, the proliferation of the nation-state,
socialism, and a civilization grasping ever more tightly to its
morality in light of the "death of its God." Any solution to the
European problem must involve a drift more in the direction of
barbarism, (not to be confused with a total reversion to barbarism),
myth, chaos, war, aristocratic forms o f government, tragedy,
pitilessness, and predatory instinct. For Europe to progress, it must
revert to a cultural direction which the modern world now
recognizes as regression; it must become more Dionysian. The West
must recover something it has lost.
A Brief Look at the Nazi Ideology
No definition of the "ideology" o f National Socialism will
satisfy everyone. For some, Nazism embodied a modernistic blend
of national pride, socialistic economic structure, militarism, and a
genuine attempt to revolt against a perceived decadence in Western
Culture. For others, the Nazi movement epitomizes sheer
charlatanism, fear, opportunism, thuggery, and sadism. They see
Hitler's pathetic if eerily effective ranting and gesturing as emanating
from a man motivated not by a vision but by an acute sense of
insecurity and hunger for power. Others may write off the whole
episode as nothing more or less than bona- fide evil. Without
question, assessing the Nazi ideology, if such exists, can be done
effectively only with great care. The Nazis undeniably hoped to
accomplish much in a positive sense. Their ideology should never be
dismissed as merely a facad to distract attention from their
6

murdering of Jews. Still, their positive points must constantly be
weighed against their compulsion for lying, their lack of humanity,
their collective lack o f conscience, their blindness to perspective, and
their respective psychological disorders. Any treatment of Nazism
which fails to take it seriously as an ideology, o r which fails to
catalogue its manifold shortcomings, is doomed to incompleteness
and incaccuracy.
While this section is devoted to the discussion of the Nazi
ideology, a digression must briefly be made. Nietzsche's distinction
between "good and evil" and "good and bad" shall be discussed more
in detail later in the essay, but the whole concept has a direct bearing
on Nazi ideology, whether an affinity exists between the Nazis and
Nietzsche or not. For Nietzsche, "evil" is nothing more than a
fiction born of fear. "One 'knows' today what is good and evil . . .
that which here glorifies itself with its praising and blaming and calls
itself good, is the instinct of the herd-animal man" (BGE 125). For
Nietzsche, anything which could in modem times be conceived of as
evil comes from culturally biased conceptions of "truth" emanating
from Christianity or from Socratic logic. Both of these coddle the
herd instincts, and both are bad. Nietzsche defines "bad" as that
which is motivated by fear, the herd, and the "slave morality."
Nietzsche defined the "good" in the ancient sense of the word, that
which is brave, singular, and literally noble. The Nazis tried to live
up to Nietzsche's definition of good, as opposed to bad. And like
him, they dismissed the entire concept of evil. As the Nazis desired
to eradicate Christian, Platonic, and humanistic notions o f "good" in
a Nietzschean sense, they also eradicated the possibility of evil, in
their own minds, as a definitions for their actions.
Like Nietzsche, the Nazis recognized Western Culture as
singularly decadent, and more than any political movement in
history, they set out to do something about it. W hile the
"philosophy" of the Nazis derived from a great number of sources,
the well-spring o f their ideology came from the rather meager
source of Hitler himself. Without question, the ultimate source of
Hitler's ideology stems from his hatred of the Jews. In fact, his
hatred o f the Jews as a race burned far hotter than his hatred of
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Judaism as a religion. With Hitler, all ideology begins with antiSemitism. Still, it must be noted that his ideology does not end there,
nor does the ideology of the leading Nazi intellectuals. In Mein
K am pf alone, Hitler relentlessly ascribed the ills of the world to the
Jews.
Hitler's feelings about the Jews, though, did not prohibit him
from battling what he perceived the ills of the world to be,
regardless of their source. Internationalism, Marxism, and pacifism,
while undoubtedly the work o f the international Jewry, were well
worthy of being hated all on their own. The Nazis believed that
internationalism had progressively dulled the instinct of nations of
people to rely upon each other as naturally created communities.
Marxism threatened to overrun any hope for a natural hierarchy
among people, and Marxists' false concept of dialectical progress
promised disastrous consequences. Pacifism had increasingly robbed
men of their naturally aggressive instincts, and their resulting failure
as men was corroding the Germanic nuclear family. Though
hampered by a delusional conspiracy theory about the international
Jewry, the Nazi ideology stood firmly against internationalism,
Marxism, and pacifism whether fostered by Jews or not. By
espousing nationalism (for everyone, not just Germany), a natural
hierarchy among peoples, and a "healthy" militarism, the Nazis
believed they offered an alternative system of values for the renewal
of Western Culture.
Nazism ostensibly fostered a close reciprocal relationship
between individual and community. The individual existed to serve
the national community which in turn had a duty to ensure a
complete existence for the individual. For a man, this meant the
assurance of work by a socialized government, and the promise of
masculine warfare through the conquest of "lesser races." Through
this system, a woman could be ensured that her husband was a
reliable provider, and a fully masculine man whose instincts were
sharp and true. A woman could then go about the business of being
a nurturing wife and mother. With healthy individuals, and healthy,
natural relationships within the Germanic nuclear household, society
could benefit both economically and morally. The Nazis' wish to
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strengthen gender roles did not stem from a need to control all
components of German society. Rather, they believed that adherence
to orders and hierarchy was a natural, and desirable alternative to
the Enlightenment's insidious fiction of freedom.
The Nazis stood firmly against Christianity. They maintained
that no religion could be of value that was bom of a Jew, especially
one that dulled the racial instincts in favor of universal brotherhood.
The official Nazi position was simply to combat the influence of the
Lutheran and Catholic churches with whom they competed for
ideological influence. The Nazis hoped eventually to undermine
loyalties to any Christian sect by emphasizing hardness, pitilessness,
and the lust for conquest amongst all Germanic types. By reverting
to ancient pagan-Germanic spirituality, the humanitarian, pacifistic,
universal, and Christian view of the world could eventually be
phased-out. The Nazis also wished to transcend any and all notions
of natural, human, or civil rights as dangerous egalitarian fictions
propagated by the victorious French Revolution, and which found
their fullest form in the doctrines of Marxism. The Nazis ultimately
sought to replace the myths of Christianity and the Enlightenment
with myths pertaining specifically to Germanic metaphysics, which
were more conducive to the "Germanic soul."
Historical Conceptions of Nietzsche as Nazi and anti-Nazi
Until very recently, the problem with any discussion of the
Nietzsche-Nazi problem"has been a distinct lack of nuanced
argumentation. Two rigid positions have been adhered to almost
without exception. The first, represented by George Lukacs, has
maintained that no thinker could have possibly been a more articulate
spokesman for the positions taken by the Nazis. An unabashed
M arxist during the period of the Nazis' growth in power, "Georg
Lukacs' definitive Marxist reading . . . portrays Nietzsche
exclusively as the irrationalist spokesman of the post-1870
reactionary bourgeoisie and as an inherently proto-fascist thinker,
father to Nazism."3 Lukacs detested Nietzsche because the two failed
3Steven Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.4.
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to agree about the nature o f dialectical historical development. "The
weakness and half-heartedness of such 'daring thinkers' as Nietzsche
or Spengler is that their relativism only abolishes the absolute in
appearance."4 For Lukacs, Nietzsche's practice of examining
cultures discretely and independently of linear historical progression,
is untenable. Lukacs epitomizes that camp among leftists who have
viewed Nietzsche’s ideas with suspicion since he first published The
Birth o f Tragedy. Traditionally, the left has viewed Nietzsche's
perspective as a threat to dialectical thinking and the hope for world
egalitarianism. Lukacs also represents the traditional leftist
reception of Nietzsche as an unwelcome advocate of myth, tradition,
privilege, warfare, and suffering.
The pre-eminent translator of Nietzsche into English, W alter
Kaufmann, represents the second and equally essentialist school of
thought on the Nietzsche-Nazi connection. Aschheim points out that
’ "as the war ended, Nietzsche's role within the politics and culture of
Germany underwent thorough revision. He was typically
metamorphosized into what was required for a democratic, anti
fascist, German identity."5 Similarly, Kaufmann set out after
World War II to rescue Nietzsche in the English-speaking, world
from the reputation of "Nazi-Philosopher." He set out to deliver
Nietzsche in a hyper-individualistic, anti-authoritarian, almost prodemocratic package. In his book Nietzsche: Philosopher,
Philologist, Antichrist, Kaufmann makes his position clear: "Hitler
and the Nazis' brazen adaptation of Nietzsche have confirmed their
misapprehensions," and their "misappropriations."6 He says nothing
more of the issue. Yet to fulfill his agenda, many of Nietzsche's
harsh and politically inexpedient tracts were intentionally softened.
This fact is now widely acknowledged. Nietzsche scholar Alan
Megill insists that, "Kaufmann's depoliticization of Nietzsche was
itself a politicization," and that he "offered an antiseptic, respectable
4Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge: The MIT Press,
1971): 187.
5Steven Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.296.
6Walter Kaufmann, Nietzche: Philosopher. Philologist. Antichrist (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1950): 8.
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Nietzsche - who would not offend American readers of the
1950's."7
The two antithetical conceptions of Nietzsche's link with the
Nazis, espoused by Lukacs and Kaufmann, are equally narrow in
scope. Most scholars have echoed the sentiments of one or the
other's position, but in the words of Aschheim, "it should come as no
surprise that the Nazi-Nietzsche relationship is discussed entirely in
these narrow terms, as one o f out-and-out distortion and radical
abuse of the master's essentially antipolitical project."8 This
scintillating topic, patently debatable, has in fact been too politically
charged to be properly handled. How "entirely narrow" has the
treatment of this topic been? Seemingly every scholar o f either
Nietzsche or the Nazis has paid curt lip-service to the issue in one
sense or the other. Few scholars have engaged in nuanced
discussions. The majority, taking Kaufmann's position, have
traditionally been no less dogmatic than he.
Georges Batailles, a French M arxist during the interwar and
post-war era, took exactly the opposite position of his ideological
compatriot Lukacs. In his famous book On Nietzsche, Batailles
stated his position succinctly: "Between the ideas of Fascist
reactionaries and Nietzsche's notions there is more than simple
difference, there is radical incompatibility."9 In Nietzsche Contra
Rousseau, Keith Ansell-Pearson makes only one reference to the
Nazis, and states that the Nazis' "unspeakable evil of the attempted
mastery of the earth"10 bore no connection to Nietzsche's work. In
his article "Nietzsche's attitude toward the Jews," Michael Duffy
makes the questionable assertion that Nietzsche is "strongly and
consistently anti-anti Semitic,"11 In Nietzsche, the Last Antipolitical
German, Peter Bergmann insists that the fictitious Nietzsche-Nazi
7Alan Megill, "Historicizing Nietzsche? Paradoxes and Lessons of a Hard Case,"
Journal of the History of Ideas 68, n o.l (March 1996): 115.
8Steven Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 1890-1990.4.
9Georges Batailles, On Nietzsche (New York: Paragon House, 1992), 170.
10Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge U.
Press, 1991), 1.
11 Michael Duffy and Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews,"
Tounal of the History of Ideas 49, no.2 (1990), 317.
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link is due only to "misconceptions about Nietzsche's political and
racial view s."12 In The -Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche,
prominent Nietzsche scholars Bem d Magnus and R.J. Hollingdale
state respectively that Nietzsche "was invoked by Fascists and Nazis
to advance the very things he loathed," and that "the connection
between Untimely Meditations and National Socialism is invisible to
the sober reader."13 In Nietzsche in Turin, Leslie Chamberlain
simply states that Nietzsche was once "absurdly taken for a N azi."14
Among scholars of Nazism, George Mosse, in Toward the Final
Solution: A History o f European Racism simply stated that Nazi
writers "confused Nazi violence with Nietzschean elan," and that
Nietzsche's "Know T hyself' knew "no nationality or race."15 In The
Cultural Roots o f National Socialism, Hermann Glaser insists that the
Nazis' use of Nietzsche was "a misinterpretation which bordered on
deliberate distortion."16
The purpose o f this cataloguing is not to point out, with a few
short quotations, the wild misconceptions of these scholars. Indeed,
many o f the above comments, in and of themselves, are true, but
they are far from the whole truth. In each of the above examples,
none of the authors expands upon their opinions that Nietzsche was ,
misappropriated by the Nazis. A quick dismissal of the NietzscheNazi link, often to the point of platitude, is the only evident
treatment of the topic. None of the above authors offer a nuanced or
evidenced discussion of the issue. This would seem less bizarre were
it not for the fact that many respected scholars share the exact
opposite opinion of the above intellectuals, and this fact is well
known. By taking a rigid stance on the issue of the Nietzsche-Nazi

12Peter Bergmann, Nietzsche: The Last Antipolitical German (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1987), 15.
13Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins, The Cambridge Companion to
Nietzsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 176.
14Leslie Chamberlain, Nietzsche in Turin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995),
6.
15George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism
(Madison: U Wisconsin Press, 1978), 196.
16Hermann Glaser, The Cultural Roots of National Socialism (Austin:
Universtiy of Texas Press), 9.

12

link, scholars take an inherently controversial position. Yet
mystifyingly, most remain unwilling to actively engage in the
controversy they are creating.
The same can be said of those who believe in the existence of
the Nietzsche-Nazi link. In 1950, the same year that Kaufmann
published Nietzsche: Philosopher, Philologist, Antichrist, Friedrich
Meinecke published The German Catastrophe in which he asserted
that "In Nietzsche's realm of ideas, which now began to exert a
powerful influence over all yearning and restless spirits, there were
gathered together almost all the noble and ignoble longings which
filled this period."17 In his article "Heidegger's Nietzsche," Michael
Gillespie persists with the notion that "Nietzsche's path was bound up
in Heidegger's view with the ambiguous end of Western thought in
Nazism."18 Zeev Stemhell, in The Birth o f Fascist Ideology, makes
clear his opinion that Nietzsche's characterization of the French
Revolution as "the last great slave rebellion"19 made him a prime
intellectual forebear to the Fascist ideology. Beyond this role,
Sternhell has little to say about Nietzsche, and, like the rest, says
nothing about Nietzsche which might bring his narrow conclusion
into question.
Perhaps the most vocal intellectual who shares this perspective
has been Ernst Nolte. In Three Faces o f Fascism, Nolte points out
that like the Nazis, "Nietzsche and the most subtle concepts of his
philosophy stood in diametric opposition to Marx," and that "the
concept of (Nietzsche's) 'blond beast' is not a freak— it is the logical
result of Nietzsche's thought."20 O f all the aforementioned scholars
from either the Lukacs or Kaufmann perspective, only Nolte
provides any real substance for his side of the debate. Nolte thinks
that
17Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950),
24.
18Michael Gillespie, "Heidegger's Nietzsche," Political Theory 15, no.3 (August
1997): 428.
19Zeev Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology (Princeton: Princeton
Universtiy Press, 1994), 250.
20Emst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York: Rinker and Winston, 1963):
442-443.
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Nietzsche is not in any obvious sense the spiritual father
of fascism; but he was the first to give voice to that
spiritual focal point toward which all fascism must
gravitate: the assault on practical and theoretical
transcendence, for the sake of a 'more beautiful' form
of life . . . The ultimate aim (of both the Nazis and
Nietzsche) was a 'supreme culture' of the future . . .
Many decades in advance, Nietzsche provided the
politically radical anti-Marxism of fascism with its
original spiritual image, an image o f which even Hitler
never quite showed himself the equal."21
Nolte portrays Nietzsche the same way in Nietzsche and
Nielzscheanism, but in broader terms. However articulate he may
be, engaging in this debate still took up only five pages of Nolte's
book. And like the rest of the aforementioned authors, he never
gives an ounce of credence to the perspective of the intellectuals on
the other side of this particular issue.
Only in the 1990's has the conspicuously closed nature of this
topic become more actively noticed. Alan Megill and Steven
Aschheim provide excellent examples o f this. Their w ork on
Nietzsche, and their attitudes toward his relationship with National
Socialism are neutral but nuanced, based largely on textual evidence,
and evidently free of dogma or conventional wisdom. Megill sees
the historic aversion to the Nietzsche-Nazi issue stemming from
historians' "tendency to shy away from the more complex and
demanding aspects of Nietzsche's work, indeed, to shy away from
Nietzsche generally. Once he is safely insane, they find him more
manageable.''22 While Megill's Nietzsche focuses on creativity and
renewal, Megill chooses not to ignore the Nietzsche who prescribes
"evil" and "the destruction of civilization," and who is an overall
"prophet of extremity." A close reading of the texts rendered Megill
no other choice. "With increasing frequency people have been
approaching Nietzsche independently of Kaufmann. They have

21Ibid., 445.
22Alan Megill, "Historicizing Nietzsche? Paradoxes and Lessons of a Hard
Case," 148.
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become skeptical of Kaufmann's tendency to deny everything in
Nietzsche that struck him as too extreme and questionable."23
For Aschheim, the labeling of Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi makes
no sense because so many un-Nazi groups have seemingly found
common cause in Nietzsche. "Socialism, anarchism, feminism, and
generational revolt of the young — these were all touched by the
libertarian magic o f Nietzsche."24 While Aschheim views
Nietzsche's appropriation by these leftist movements as generally
absurd, Aschheim's Nietzsche could never fit comfortably into any
single ideology. Aschheim points out Nietzsche's famous quote that
"I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them," and that "the will to a
system is a lack of integrity."25 That said, Aschheim believes that if
any ideology were able to incorporate Nietzsche with any
consistency, the group hitherto best suited to that purpose must have
been the Nazis. Aschheim asserts that "Nietzsche provided a fruitful
source for the themes . . . for a post-liberal, post-M arxist, national
regeneration," and that "the ingredients of the socialist Nietzschean
religion and its volkish counterpart were not always that
different."26 Aschheim sums up the lack of integrity hitherto
displayed in the Nietzsche-Nazi debate in the following way:
The dominant postwar images — embodied in the
opposed representations of George Lukacs and Walter
Kaufmann - have either condemned Nietzsche as
centrally complicit in the Nazi evil or lauded him for
being unblemished and opposed to all Nazism's
intentions and actions. Both these approaches were less
interested in tracing actual historical paths than pursuing
their own value-laden interpretations. This certainly did
not constitute good cultural history.27

23Alan Megill, The Prophets of Extremity (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988), 30.
24Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.90.
25Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, from Steven E. Aschheim, The
Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.90.
26Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe. 148,150.
27Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.315.
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Aschheim argues that the hyper-accentuation of "value-laden
interpretations" at the end of W orld W ar II was an understandable,
inevitable, perhaps even desirable reaction to the Nazis willful
inhumanity and their near-victorious assault on time-honored
Western values. Yet those same value-laden interpretations have
prevented cultural historians from telling us what actually happened.
By rescuing Nietzsche from the Nazis, Kaufmann, to a large extent,
simply gave us a Nietzsche that did not exist.28 Those who opposed
Kaufmann did so from an equally hyperbolic perspective. When
emotional issues bum hot, as any issue dealing with the Nazis did at
the end of W orld W ar II, judgm ent becomes clouded. Now, over a
half-century since the Nazis have been defeated, Megill and
Aschheim beckon us to drop our emotional baggage, value-laden
interpretations, hyperbolic language, and political posturing, and to
explore the ideological link between Nietzsche and the Nazis as the
evidence permits. In other words, the task remains of exploring
those parts of Nietzsche's thought that cut against the National
Socialist ideology, and those which served as a boon for the Nazis'
ideological coffers.

28Whenever possible, I have used Kaufmann's translations of Nietzsche. I
hope that if an ideological link can be identified between Nietzsche and the
Nazis, even through a repressed Kaufmann translation, that this will add
credibility to the essay.
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Chapter II:
Nietzsche as the Antithesis of National Socialism
Anyone who claims that Nietzsche's ideology provided the
perfect fit for the Nazis is either lying or has not read much
Nietzsche. Among Nietzsche's chief concerns was the individual as
artist. Nietzsche believed that mass movements inevitably led to
dogma, never creativity. His hatred o f systems of thought, among
many other reasons, would have led him to reject the Nazi party as
surely as he would have rejected any other political party. In more
specific terms, Nietzsche loathed anti-Semitism, race mania, and
nation-state politics. He hated political organizations. In them he
found the harbingers of mediocrity. He also found politics boring.
Each of these topics shall be explored, but perhaps the best place to
start is with Nietzsche's detestation of both nationalism and socialism.
Nationalism
The Nazis made German nationalism infamous, but German
nationalism did not begin with the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. Waves
of fanatical nationalism have swept through Germany since the
Napoleonic conquest of 1806. Under the French banner of "liberte,
egalite, fraternite," freedom came to mean self-determination for the
German nation. Eventually, the ’’progressive" origins of nationalism
would become estranged from the more volkish connotations of
"nation" in the German language. The Nazis, like Nietzsche, would
come to view the Revolution's legacies of liberty, equality, and
fraternity as the grave stupidities of the left. The natural result of
the Revolution's "slave rebellion in morals," (BGE 118) must be to
stifle heroism, genius, and excellence in all its forms.
While the Nazis clung to the Revolution's original ideal of
nationalism as self-determination for peoples, Nietzsche condemned
the whole Revolutionary experiment as a grave, though logical
outcome of Christianity. The Nazis viewed nationalist exclusivism as
the antidote to the Enlightenment's poisonous universalism, but
Nietzsche saw each of these "isms" as various heads emanating from
the same monster. The Nazis believed that nationalism would rescue

17

the German people from the Christian and Enlightenment
experiments to convert humanity into a single race of pacified herd
animals. Nietzsche insisted that nationalism professed to counteract
universalism, but instead created a new and insidiously potent
compulsion to conform, obey, and become a member of the herd.
These antithetical approaches to nationalism as a concept can
be illustrated by comparing Nietzsche's and Hitler's attitudes to the
popular German phrase, "Deutschland, Deutschland liber alles."
When Nietzsche proclaimed "Deutschland iiber alles, I think that was
the end of German culture," (TW1 506) he referred to what he saw
as the growing ubiquity of the German herd mentality. Once, when
no strong German state existed, German culture took center stage in
the world. During Nietzsche's time, when the mental, physical, and
above all spiritual energies of Germany increasingly subordinated
themselves to the state, he predicted that German culture would
wither on the vine. As the state grew stronger, fewer and fewer
Bachs, Mozarts, Kants, Beethovens, Hegels, Goethes, Schillers, and
Nietzsches would emerge. At best, Germany would get more
Bismarcks.
For Hitler, "So many times had I sung 'Deutschland liber alles'
and shouted with full voice 'Heil,' that I considered it almost a
belated favor that I was now allowed to appear as a witness before
the tribunal of the Eternal Judge in order to proclaim the truth and
sincerity of my convictions."1 Hitler believed that if each German
honored the blood and soil of the fatherland with his deepest
loyalties, the resulting "convictions" would allow the German people
to accomplish any goal they set for themselves, particularly the
conquest of Lebensraum in the east. Hitler did not see the mass
movement of nationalism in itself, necessarily, as an inhibitor of the
individual’s creativity. Hitler did not view the participant in massive
Nazi rallies as a capitulator to the herd-mentality. Hitler viewed the
capacity of the German people to expand German culture as an
exercise in creativity on a scale so grand that all Germans could
claim a share of it for themselves.
1Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf.212.
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Nietzsche would have responded to this idea with his classic
assertion that "Culture and the state —one should not deceive oneself
about this are antagonists . . . All great ages of culture are ages of
political decline: what is great culturally has always been unpolitical,
even anti-political" (TW I 569). An analysis of German cultural
history renders the same conclusion. From the early Middle Ages
through Jena and Auerstadt, the existence of the Holy Roman Empire
resulted in the perpetual political disunity o f the Germans. Hundreds
of sovereign principalities maintained a static and divisive network
of political boundaries. Due to political stagnation, hundreds of
Germanic cultures and dialects remained hermetically sealed off
from their neighbors to a degree unique in Europe. Only the Italians
could rival this German phenomenon. To Nietzsche, Germany's
political disunity became her culture's saving grace. So long as the
German princes had controlled Germany, nationalism could not
flourish. Spanish identity politics produced the inquisition. English
nationalism produced Parliament, the consummate achievement of
the slave morality. The nationalism of the French resulted in the
dogma, rapine, and unparalleled herd mentality o f the Revolution.
For Nietzsche, Germany remained conspicuously free o f such
malignancies so long as she remained free o f nationalism. For
Nietzsche, in the words of Alan Megill, "the present is in a state of
absolute dereliction, it lacks any redeeming features, anything that
might allow us to reconcile ourselves to things as they are."2
In other words, that which is most modem, in this case
nationalism, can only represent an unheralded degree of decadence,
decline, and nihilism, but certainly not culture. Hitler exempted his
brand of nationalism from Nietzsche's equation. The Nazis offered
national cohesion based on virtues forged long before Christianity,
humanism, the Enlightenment, western decadence, and the modem
victory of the slave morality. For Hitler, the Holy Roman Empire
had resulted in "the slow extermination of Germanism,"3 and the
consequent imposition of M editerranean-Christian slave morals and
2Alan Megill, The Prophets of Extremity. 33.
3Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf.15.
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laws. Because he advocated a modern version of the Germans'
ancient pagan-aristocracy, Hitler viewed his "Germanism" as
satisfying both Nietzsche's admiration for the master morality, and
his aversion to m odem movements and value systems. By
advocating ancient values, albeit under a nationalist rubric, Hitler
ostensibly cut off one of the heads of the monster modernity.
Yet Nietzsche would have insisted that many new disfigured
heads sprout up in nationalism's place. To the extent that
"Germanism" ever existed, and came much closer to the master than
to the slave morality, its "modem" version emanated from mere
caricatures of history. Nietzsche would have deemed Hitler's attempt
to "revaluate values" as a failure as well. Though based on heroism,
instinct, and emotionalism, pagan-German barbarism failed to satisfy
the rational side of man that made him whole. Souls quenched only
by land, blood, and spectacle could never be truly satisfied. The
consummation of such a wish would artificially tilt any human
toward the Dionysian. The Nuremberg rallies eerily epitomized the
shortcomings of an ethics based primarily on volkish euphoria.
For Nietzsche, the return to an imaginary, organic, preChristian past was not only unsatisfying and therefore undesirable, it
was also impossible. The German soul had been crucified on the
world-oak of Hegel's dialectic, and an entirely new path, not a
replica of an old one, must be found. Germans could not will their
"eternal return" through national hysteria, indoctrination, halftruths, or a return to a distant point on a path toward a failed future.
By definition, Nietzsche’s vision of the Germans' (or humanity's)
renewal would not be attained through a n y ideology born of the
modem world, nationalism included.
Contrary to what most other people would think, Nietzsche
and Hitler would have agreed that nationalism has a civilizing effect
on the individual. For Hitler, this represented the ultimate goal, for
Nietzsche, the ultimate catastrophe. W hile conventional wisdom
maintains that the Nazis epitomized barbarism, Nietzsche would have
focused on their compulsion toward order, uniformity, obedience,
consistency, and the antiseptic as qualities characterizing an extreme
form of the Apollonian, or civilizing instinct. For Nietzsche, this
i.
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represented an unhealthy extreme at the polar opposite of Dionysian
barbarism. It would not have surprised Nietzsche that for Goebbels,
nationalism meant "the final fulfillment of peace and community . . .
to form the nation as a community of need, bread, and fate, to end
the corruption o f democracy and international (money)."4 For
Nietzsche, only decadent cultures attempt to civilize, as they cannot
envision their own survival without curbing the creative chaos of
which individuals are capable.
How does it happen that the state will do a host of things
that the individual would never countenance?—Through
division of responsibility, of command, and of
execution. Through the interposition of the virtues of
obedience, duty, patriotism, and loyalty. Through
upholding pride, severity, strength, hatred, revenge — in
short, all typical characteristics that contradict the herd
type (WP 383).
Nietzsche would have been dismayed at the Nazi will to create order
in a society which already suffered from an over-abundance of
Apollonian order. In this sense, the Nazis only represented a
quickening of the decadence which they sought to overcome.
When Hitler claims that "state citizenship is the most valuable
document for (a m an’s) entire earthly life,"5 he asserts that a
person's role, as stipulated by the state, is his most definitive
characteristic. This emblemizes nationalism's destruction of the
creative will as emphasized by Nietzsche. "This absurd condition of
Europe cannot go on much longer! Is there any idea at all behind
this bovine nationalism? What value can there be now, when
everything points to wider and more common interests, in
encouraging this boorish self-conceit" (WP 395)? Nationalism can
result only in the decline of humanity's likeness to beasts of prey,
and an increase in its likeness to the ultimate herd animals, cattle.
The infamous caricature of a German town in Thus Spake
j

4Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1971), 127.
5Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 659.
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Zarathustra, The Motley Cow, was full of such people. In
Nietzsche's eyes, nationalism taxes all that is singular and contributes
only to what is common. As it civilizes, it further contributes to the
decline of Western Culture.
Socialism
Ernst Nolte pointed out that "Nietzsche and the most subtle
concepts of his philosophy stood in diametric opposition to M arx."6
By this, Nolte meant that Marx's ultimate vision of a world of
classless inclusivity has been countered by no one more potently than
by Nietzsche, for whom: "socialism glorifies the qualities through
which man is tame, peaceable, and useful to the herd as real human
virtues: namely public spirit, benevolence, consideration,
industriousness, moderation, modesty, forbearance, and pity" (BGE
171). As one might guess from this quotation, Nietzsche saw little to
choose between the concepts of nationalism and socialism. They
were supposedly separated by the right/left dichotomy (nationalism
vs. internationalism) but both sought greater inclusivity, mass
culture, an erosion o f class hierarchy, minimization of individuality
(for fear of more Napoleonic egos), the imposition of order (the
ultimate hindrance to true culture in Europe), and the political
legislation of values. Nietzsche differed from both Marx and Hitler
in his consistent defense of the concept of hierarchical privilege for
every sector of society.
Hitler knew that socialism did not mix perfectly with the other
ingredients of a supposedly right-wing ideology. In fact, Hitler felt
compelled to justify his socialism by distinguishing it from the
socialism of the M arxist tradition. Chief Nazi philosopher Alfred
Rosenberg concurred with Hitler that nationalism and socialism were
not necessarily antithetical. Rosenberg possessed an expertise on
such matters that far exceeded Hitler's. The Nazi intellectual had
earned Ph.D.'s in both history and philosophy. Also, Rosenberg
grew up and was educated in Lithuania. Living next to the Soviet
giant mandated that all intellectual issues take Marxist theory into
6Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism. 442.
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account. Still, Rosenberg supported "Hitler, (who) had come to the
conclusion that a just socialism had, per se, nothing to do with class
war and internationalism. To perpetuate class war was wrong . . .
As far as the workers were concerned it was, therefore, a question of
renouncing this doctrine as well as their opposition both to the
farm er and the property ow ner."7 As Hitler viewed Marx as "a
master magician o f the black arts,"8 it might seem odd that he would
advocate any type of socialism at all. H itler clearly felt that German
socialism could be differentiated from the Marxist package of
internationalism, class warfare, dictatorship by proletariat, and
dialectical reasoning.
,
Again, Nietzsche could never justify socialism under any
circumstance. He viewed it as a logical step in the continuous
degradation o f Western Culture, nothing more. Socialism obviously
resulted from the ongoing march of a victorious slave morality.
W estern Culture had become too exhausted to support what
Nietzsche called "higher types." The slavish multitudes had become
too docile even to understand higher, instinctual, predatory human
beings. As a result, everyone becomes increasingly entitled to the
same rights and the same opportunities. Eventually, all people will
come more to resemble than to differ from one another. For
Nietzsche, this was the ultimate, universal goal of Christianity, the
secular ideal of the French Revolution, and the dialectical promise of
Marx. All o f these represent stepping stones on a path to complete
degeneracy.
The collective degeneration of man, down to that which
the socialist dolts and blockheads today see as their 'man
of the future' - as their ideal! - this degeneration and
diminution o f man to the perfect herd animal (or, as
they say, to the man of the 'free society'), this
animalization of man to the pygmy animal of equal
rights and equal pretensions is possible, there is no
doubt about that (BGE 127-128)!
7Alfred Rosenberg, The Diaries of Alfred Rosenberg (New York: Ziff-Davis,
1949), 56.
8Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 579.
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As the Nazis ignored Nietzsche's rejection o f socialism, they
implemented an array of programs which,, even by today's standards
would seem patently "progressive." Ronald Smelser outlines some
prime examples.
1) A comprehensive welfare state system designed by state planners
2) A society geared to the upward mobility, indeed the
embourgeoisiement, o f workers
3) A mass consumer society orientation with acceptance of
materialism as a legitimate individual aspiration
4) The full acceptance o f urban, industrial society along with its
concomitants, advanced technology and the rationalization or
productive processes
5) The acceptance and partial realization of "progressive" labor
legislation, especially laws protecting youth and women on the jo b 9
Hitler committed him self to eradicating privilege and
institutionalizing leveling programs within German society, but he
consistently portrayed himself as the ideological antithesis to Karl
Marx. "Though 'Socialist,' Hitler presented him self as the savior of
Western Civilization against Bolshevism, the bulwark o f Europe
against Stalin."10 Hitler ultimately envisioned a goal o f "a German
democracy in contrast to the spineless international one that, in 1918,
had taken the helm in G erm any."11 In contrast, Nietzsche saw
democracy and socialism as similar strains of the same disease, even
if dressed up in a "Germanic" costume to pose as something other
than Western democracy. For him, all modem political systems
shared the same disfigured origin; all have merely secularized the
slave morality o f the Christians in one form or another. To the
limited extent that Nietzsche maintained a political vision, he
harkened back to the aristocratic-warrior culture of the Greek polis.
9Ronald Smelser, How "Modern" were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the
Modernization Question," German Studies Review 13. no.2 (1990): 295.
10Christopher E. Forth, "Nietzsche, Decadence, and Regeneration in France,
1891-95." Journal of the History of Ideas54.no. 1 (1993): 116.
11Alfred Rosenberg, The Diaries of Alfred Rosenberg. 130.
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Only the Overman could reattain such a healthy form of
government, emerging as a "bolt o f lightning" from the "dark cloud"
of modern political institutions.12
Nietzsche's incorporation into the canon of socialist
intellectuals marks a grand absurdity. Georges Sorel and Benito
Mussolini began their careers as Marxist ideologues, but came to be
deeply influenced by Nietzsche. Many other Marxists of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries counted Nietzsche among
their intellectual influences. Yet now, "leftist" Nietzscheans such as
Sorel and Mussolini are indisputably included in the canon o f the
right. For more than a century, socialists have tried unsuccessfully
to wed their philosophy to that of Nietzsche. The more they
incorporate Nietzsche, as Sorel and Mussolini did, the less "socialist"
they become. Karl Kraus humorously labeled all attempted
"Nietzschean Socialists" as "superapes of the coffeehouses."13
Throughout his writings, Nietzsche heaped scorn upon those
who wished to liberate the proletariat and turn them into
Ubermenschen. If Nietzsche viewed himself as dynamite, and the
Supermen as bolts of lightning, the masses of Germany were
indestructible bastions of uncreativity. Nietzsche believed that no
mass movement within millennia of the modern age could forge a
race of Supermen, least of all by the use of socialism. Nietzsche
regarded the notion of forging such a race among pacified, satisfied,
equalized proletarians as patently impossible. He envisioned a future
race of "beasts of prey and the like,"14 ruled by their primal
instincts, and their independent, cultivated intellects. By either
criteria, they would be free of any and all moral constraints.
Liberated from dogma, a race o f such ravenous warriorphilosophers could never be "socialized."

12Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Who is the Ubermensch? Time, Truth, and Woman in
Nietzsche," Journal of the History of Ideas 53, no.2 (1992): 323.
13Steven W. Aschheim, "Nietzschean Socialism - Left and Right, 1890-1933,"
153.
14Ibid., 150.
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Nietzsche Contra Artifice
In The Will to Pow er, Nietzsche referred to socialists as
"superficial, envious, three-quarter actors" (W P 77). He certainly
despised them for their exploitation of what he regarded as an
inauthentic representation of culture. The state-run socialist utopia
represents a complete vacuum of culture, not its final victory. But
Nietzsche's condemnation of socialists only underscores his
detestation of inauthenticity in general. Many of his most original
and scornful cultural criticisms stem from his unique ability to
recognize affectation and hypocrisy where no one else could. Many
of the Nazis' most cherished "fasci" or symbols were German
cultural icons previously excoriated by Nietzsche. The most obvious
of these was the music o f Richard Wagner.
Hitler stated in Mein K am pf that "as really great statesmen, but
also great reformers . . . side by side with Frederick the Great stands
a Martin Luther as well as a Richard W agner."15 Hitler idolized in
W agner precisely what Nietzsche despised. W agner mesmerized
Germany into believing that by rejuvenating their ancient pagan
instincts, the Germans could use their new-found organic spirituality
to renew their own culture and possibly the entire West. Through
opera, W agner induced his German audience into a feeling of
nostalgia through dream-like imagery of a heroic Germanic past that
included foggy forests, echoing, misty mountains, pagan ritual, and
celestial Nordic tragedy. He gave artistic expression to the Germans'
near-ubiquitous late nineteenth-century belief in a "Germanic soul."
Hitler saw Tristan and Isolde 33 times alone. He regarded the
inducement of the effects of W agner's opera on the population as
bona-fide cultural reform, and the effect of a "great reformer."
Nietzsche too had once experienced Hitler's nostalgic
exhilaration with Wagner. Through his early years as a professor at
Basel, Nietzsche and W agner shared a close friendship. Louise
Elizabeth Bachofen, an acquaintance of Nietzsche's, observed in an
1872 letter: "I knew Nietzsche in this early period when he was still
enthused by Wagner. And how enthused he was! Every Sunday he
15Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 287.

26

traveled to Lucerne and returned from these each time filled with his
God and told me of the splendors he had seen and heard; I believe
most firmly that his break with W agner was a deathblow for
Nietzsche."16 Indeed, Nietzsche's break with W agner taxed him
emotionally, but to a degree, it marked a new era in his personal
philosophy. According to Ansell-Pearson, "Nietzsche's break with
W agner is equally a break with the political idealism and cultural
romanticism of his youth."17
Nietzsche remained enamored with the possibility of rebirth
through myth, but he came to see W agnerian myth as sheer
charlatanism. While W agner made no secret of his anti-Semitism,
George Mosse points out that "Wagner's operas were not mired in
bitterness laCed with hatred of the Jewish race."18 Nietzsche came to
see much more in W agner's operas worthy of scorn. W agner's
operas professed cultural renewal when in fact, W agner epitomized
the seeming inability of German artists to create something new that
did not depend on cheap imitation. Once Nietzsche realized this, he
could not salvage his relationship with the W agner family.
How
and why this change in Nietzsche came to pass remains somewhat of
a mystery. Still, the mutation in Nietzsche’s intellectual orientation
is very detectable in his works. In The Case o f Wagner, Nietzsche
stated that "There is nothing on which W agner has reflected so much
as on redemption. Somebody or other always wants to be redeemed:
nOw a little man, now a little woman — that is his problem" (CW
460). Nietzsche detected a smallness in the thinking in W agner, and
resented that such a smallness could become a prescription of
renewal for an entire culture. He said in Twilight o f the Idols that in
certain ages, "art has a right to pure foolishness — as a kind of
vacation for spirit, wit, and feeling. W agner understood that. Pure
foolishness restores" (TWI 532). Late nineteenth century Germany

16Sander L. Gilman, Conversations with Nietzsche: A l ife in the Words of His
Contemporaries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 50.
17Keith Ansell Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 27.
18George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 102.
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was not an age capable of restoration by foolishness. The foolishness
of modernity had been far too much to overcome already. Instead,
Nietzsche hoped for an injection of authenticity into an age
seemingly devoid of it.
Wagnerian artifice apparently found its way into every one of
Hitler's policies and decisions. The very definition of "fascism"
originates in "symbolism." Hitler's myths often resembled Wagner's
portrayals of an arcane Germanic past that never was. Hitler
incessantly repeated the unique "culture-founding power of
Germanic blood,"19 only to attempt the fo rced foundation of culture
through state programs. In W agner's Niebelungenlied, the noble
tribe of Germanic Niebelungen are destroyed by the wily and
treacherous Asiatic hordes of Ghengis Khan. Himmler was
particularly fond of inculcating fear of and pitilessness against "these
same inferior races, that at one time appeared under the names of
Huns, Magyars, Tartars, and Mongols, arid which today appear as
Russians under the banner of Bolshevism."20 The most fundamental
conviction of both W agner and Hitler was that Germanic blood could
not help but create superior culture, and enforce its dominance.
Nietzsche had always dismissed this way of thinking as absurd, and
dangerous. "Thus I attacked W agner—more precisely, the falseness,
the half-couth instincts" (EH 232) The conviction that Germanic
culture could not help but reign supreme had resulted in an excuse
for intellectual laziness that the Germans could ill-afford.
Nietzsche's Disdain for the Germans
Any discussion of Nietzsche's contempt for inauthenticity must
include some discussion o f his disdain for the Germans themselves.
Nietzsche certainly believed that virtues and vices could distinguish
one race or ethnic group from another. To him, the Germans'
differentiating features should serve as an embarrassment to them.
Nietzsche took for gospel many of the post-Darwinian racial theories
of his own day, but not the myth of Germanic racial superiority. To
19Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 338.
20Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich . 248.
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the contrary, Nietzsche viewed the singular mark of the Germans to
be their uniquely disoriented collective spirit. Playing on one of
Goethe's most famous lines from Faust, Nietzsche insisted that "a
German who would make bold to say 'two souls, alas, within my
bosom dwell' would fall short o f the truth by a large number of
souls" (BGE 174). Nietzsche noted the effects of race mixing among
the supposedly "pure" Germans, and regarded them among the least
ethnically pure of all European peoples. The Germans also
maintained a conspicuous genius for Romanticism. Nietzsche
regarded these traits, and the German will to obey as the
outcroppings of a people whose souls were in turmoil, and in a
uniquely desperate search for a foundation.
The Germans are more incomprehensible, more
incomprehertsive, more full of contradictions, more
unknown, more incalculable, more surprising, even to
themselves, than other peoples are . . . It is
characteristic of the Germans that the question 'what is
German?' never dies out among them (BGE 174).
Because of their disorientation, the German attachment to the father
figure in the form of Frederick the Great, W ilhelm I, or Bismarck
should not be surprising. Nietzsche's criticisms of the Germans left
no stone unturned. He even castigated their diet. "Add to this the
virtually bestial drinking habits o f the Germans, and you will
understand the origin of the German spirit—from distressed
intestines" (EH 238).
According to Bernd M agnus, during the Third Reich,
"Nietzschean qualities were simply projected onto idealized
depictions of the Nordic race,"21 but Nietzsche never believed in a
romanticized racial archetype with blond hair and blue eyes, standing
six foot plus, and with an unblemished, chiseled face. Though he
may have approved of such components once the "Superman" had
already emerged (Nietzsche possessed a very pronounced aesthetic

21Bemd Magnus, "Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888: The Will to Power and the
Ubermensch," Journal of the History of Philosophy 24.n o.l (19861:94.
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side), such aesthetic trivialities meant nothing until one started with a
spiritually superior being. Secondly, Nietzsche never believed that
the Germans were capable of producing such men, and a religion
based on such characteristics could perhaps only happen in Germany
where "the German is acquainted with the hidden path to chaos," and
the German, above all, "loves his symbol" (BGE 175).
Why did Nietzsche feel compelled to address the issue of
Germanic racial superiority at all? To a large extent, W agner,
Darwin, and H.S Chamberlain emblemize much more than the
popularization of the myth of Teutonic racial superiority. They
reflect a quintessentially European view of the world at the end of
the nineteenth century. Even the "progressive" Marx maintained
radically racist ideas, especially about his own people, as in "The
Jewish Question?" At any rate, the subject of the Germans' place in
the "racial hierarchy" constantly arose in the academic settings of
Nietzsche's day, and he had occasion to give it much thought. He
found the whole widespread acceptance of the idea that Germanic
blood automatically equated to cultural supremacy positively
mystifying. In a letter to a rabid Germanophile of his day, Theodor
Fritsch, he stated, "I must confess that the 'German spirit' of our
times is so alien to me that only with great impatience can I observe
its mannerism, among which I especially include anti-Semitism."22
For Nietzsche, race in and of itself was the guarantor of nothing.
This contrasts sharply with Hitler, whose fondest hope for the
Germans lay in that portion o f the peasant population whose blood
had supposedly not yet mixed with the Slavs and other races. "This
is the blessing of the failure of complete mixture: that even today we
still have in our German national body great stocks of NordicGermanic people who remain unblended, in whom we may see the
most valuable treasure for our future."23
In the words of Dominick La Capra, "Nietzsche was perhaps
the first modern thinker to provide a radical critique of both

22Yirmiyahu Yovel, Dark Riddle: Hegel. Nietzsche, and the Tews (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1998), 127.
23Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 600.
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metaphysical tradition and modem context as 'decadent."24
Nietzsche's mockery of the Germans extended well beyond the
artifice of their identity as culturally superior. That represented
only a portion of their mental handicap to creativity. W agner
epitomized the Germans' slavery to myth, and their failure to
spiritually jettison themselves from Christianity . Western Culture
could not be refounded while bound by such heavy chains.
"Nietzsche was offended by W agner's final composition of Parsifal:
retelling the Grail story, it capitulated, in Nietzsche's view, to the
Christian moral system ."25 One of the primary concerns of both
Nietzsche and W agner was the prospect of cultural revolution and
renewal. Yet for Nietzsche, any proposed renewal could not succeed
if it were cut from the same, wom -out cultural cloth that needed to
be replaced. Nietzsche believed that the German lack of creativity
(of which he came to regard W agner as the paragon) was endemic,
bordered on innate, and reduced all of the Germans' attempts at
cultural renewal to nostalgic imitation. W orst o f all, they were not
even imaginative enough to recognize their own lack of creativity.
If such characterizations o f the Germans are correct, Hitler fit
the mold in many ways. Nietzsche believed that "the historical
process begins with the master's bloody battle (against his eventual
slave) and ends in some sense with the modem bourgeois inhabitants
of contemporary liberal democracies, who pursue material gain
rather than glory."26 As already noted, a stated position of the
National Socialist platform was an acceptance of the pursuit of
economic gain by the individual. Nietzsche believed that any current
attempted solution to the problem of the decadence of W estern
Culture, particularly one that did not solve a problem as evident as
materialism, was doomed to failure. Yet Hitler's posturing by way
of solutions did not end with his economic theories. Hitler, of

24Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts. Contexts, and
Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 97.
25Alan Megill, "Historicizing Nietzsche? Paradoxes and Lessons of a Hard
Case," 120.
26Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon
Books, 1992), 120.
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course, was one of the world's most unrelenting anti-Semites, yet in
Mein Kampf, for example, he declared that "the language o f the antiSemitic Viennese press was unworthy of the cultural traditions of a
great race. I was depressed by the memory of certain events in the
Middle Ages which I did not wish to see repeated."27
O f course, no one better imitated the shameful Jew-hunts of
the Middle Ages better than Hitler did. When the Nazis assumed
power in Germany and stated in an official proclamation that "The
German Government and the German nation are united in the
determination to carry on a policy of peace, conciliation, and
understanding as a basis of all decisions and all actions,"28 and that
too was sheer duplicity. Once,
Hitler invited all the senior generals to a demonstration
at the Juterborg artillery school, where exact replicas of
the Czech fortifications had been constructed. An
infantry attack on an artillery barrage was mounted as
well. The actual damage was disappointing, but H itlerafter clambering through the concrete fortifications—
proclaimed himself astonished by the devastation.29
A complete documentary of the many ways that the Nazis engaged in
lying and deception, even to themselves, would consume a multivolume series. Suffice it to say that Nietzsche would likely have seen
in the Nazis a classic German tactic, best demonstrated by Wagner,
of substituting posture and mania for imaginative, creative, original
cultural solutions.
A rt and the Individual
In many ways, Hitler's conception of culture merely echoed
Nietzsche's conception of traditional W estern oppression as the great
bane to individuals' creativity. The Nazis' artificial conception of
culture reflected a distorted view of individual capability. In the
27Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 68.
28Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 100.
29Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York: Vantage Books,
1995), 100.
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words of Alan Bullock, "Hitler saw himself, in Nietzsche's term, 'as
an artist-politician,' the inspired leader who molded the thoughts and
feelings of the nation and uplifted them into a vision of unity and
greatness."30 Hitler thought he possessed the right to suppress the
creative expression of anyone in society based on the overall needs of
the Volk. He felt that since "the results of art, science, and
techniques are almost exclusively the creative product of the
A ryan,"31 that every German maintained the capacity for great art,
but that the need for agriculture and industry with the society
mandated withholding of the creative capacity o f most. While Hitler
predictably attributed "ninety per cent of all literary and artistic
rubbish and theatrical humbug"32 within the Reich to the Jews, he
never even called for a reactionary, Aryan artistic revolution, as one
might have expected from an "artist-politician," to demonstrate the
ubiquity of Germanic artistic genius.
To Nietzsche, "art is that which liberates us from enslavement
to a moral world-order and affords us the opportunity of creating
the world anew."33 For Nietzsche, cultural renewal could not
succeed unless the individuals within the culture were free o f moral
constraint. To be so free, artistic license was required. The Nazis
substituted for such artistic freedom a state-sponsored campaign of
"artistic awareness." "Goebbels persuaded Hitler to give him control
not only over the press, radio, films, and theaters, but also over the
arts as well, including books, music and the visual arts, all brought
under the Reich Chamber of Culture."34 After conducting the most
famous of the student book burnings in May of 1933, Goebbels
declared that "from these ashes will arise the phoenix o f a new
spirit."35 The "new spirit" to which Goebbels referred was "to
bring art to the people by pretending that high culture was the

30Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 318.
31Adolph Hitler. Mein Kampf. 397.
32Ibid., 77.
33Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 117.
34Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 318.
35Ibid.
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natural property of the people. Thus, the Nazis tried to attribute a
popular meaning to the concept of culture and make it seem that in
the future the Volk would determine the mainstream of cultural
production. Art was to be the symbol of good and sane
'norm ality."36
Though in Hitler's words, "the German is the sole ow ner and
propagator o f a truly artistic m ind,"37 he planned to reduce the
German people's opportunity to create art to the replication of state
ideology and/or the spoon-feeding of government approved art. It
says much about the Nazis that the duties of the Minister of Art and
the Minister of Propaganda were given to the same person,
Goebbels. Art and all of the creative powers of the individual were
to be harnessed for the benefit of the Volk. Perhaps everything
singular that could not be absorbed by the commonest dolt had to be
brought down to the lowest level. Nietzsche found few things more
abhorrent than the use of art for the literal negation of creativity.
"What should win our gratitude.-- Only artists, and especially those
of the theater, have given men eyes and ears to see and hear with
some pleasure what each man is himself, experiences himself, desires
himself; only they have taught us to esteem the hero that is concealed
in everyday characters" (GSC 132-133). For Nietzsche, it was
precisely the purposelessness of art that made it vital to existence.
Art must be a reflection of the chaotic impulse of Dionysis, a respite
from the everyday order of civilization. W hen art becomes
subsumed in purpose, most particularly in the purposes of the state,
it speaks to us only of its decadence. "Greek taste.— 'W hat is
beautiful in it? asked the surveyor after a performance of Iphigenia;
'nothing is proved in it" (GSC 136)!
Perhaps the most remembered "artistic" performances of the
Third Reich were the impassioned and mesmerizing speeches of
Hitler. Without question, Hitler had some artistic talent, but his
ability to convey messages found its ultimate outlet through his
3(?Adelheid von Saldern, "Cultural Conflicts, Popular Mass Culture, and the
Question of Nazi Success: The Eilenriede Motorcycle Races, 1924-1939," German
Studies Review 15, no.2 (1992): 320.
3 7Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 90.
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oratorical skills. Hitler admittedly repeated his messages ad nauseum
for the effect of indoctrination, and with each repetition, the mania
of the crowd increased. Again, this begs a comparison with
Nietzsche's, castigations of Wagner.
I know very well what sort o f music and art I do not
w ant-nam ely, the kind that tries to intoxicate the
audience and to force it to the height of a moment of
strong and elevated feelings. This kind is designed of
those everyday souls who in the evening are not like
victors on their triumphal chariots but rather like tired
mules who have been whipped too much by life (GSC
141).
Only in such an imitative atmosphere could the Germans have
abided the many other Nazi impositions upon their liberties. As
previously shown, the Nazis wished to dictate to the German people
exactly what did and did not constitute art. Hitler stated in Mein
K am pf that "The movement has to promote the respect for the
personality by all means; it must never forget that the value of all
that is human is rooted in the personal value, and that every idea and
every achievement are the results of the creative force of man, and
that the admiration for the greatness is not only a tribute o f thanks to
the latter."38 True to his duplicitous nature, Hitler later declared
that "the state has to appear as the guardian of a thousand years'
future, in the face of which the wish and the egoism of the individual
appears as nothing and has to submit."39 Heinrich Himmler's chief
editorial writer for the SS periodical Das Schwarze Corps stated
simply that "he who is different is unable to recognize the laws of
nature."40 Nietzsche dreamt that the assault on W estern Culture
would result in a perfect new venue for creativity. The Nazis' will
to impose near-total control failed even to make contact with this
vision.

38Ibid., 488.
39Ibid., 608.
40George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, xx.
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It only befits a movement that tended toward the
mechanization of the human being to stoop to the worship of
technology. "Technology was to be transferred from 'civilization' to
'culture'"41 for the better preservation of the members of the Reich.
In addition, "technology was to be reconciled with Geist. "42 But for
Nietzsche, the capacity for self-preservation, either among
individuals or for the group, should always play a secondary role.
"The struggle for existence is only an exception, a temporary
restriction of the will to life. The great and small struggle always
revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around
power--in accordance with the will to power which is the will o f
life" (GSC 292).
Nietzsche believed that the retention of energies for the
purpose of survival underscored the weaknesses of both individuals
and cultures. That survival is today not taken for granted means that
not enough energy and attention are devoted to living an authentic
existence. Perhaps the failure o f the Nazis to deliver the promise of
the greater "Dasein" finalized Heidegger's decision to leave the
party. Nietzsche admired those cultures that provided for the
cultivation of higher human beings. But the Nazis effectively willed
to render an entire nation as uncreative as the rank-and-file of their
party tended to be. According to Bullock, "The predominant tone
of the party was lower middle class: vulgar, heavily male, and beer
drinking, chauvinist, xenophobic, authoritarian, anti-Semitic, anti
intellectual, antiemancipatory, antimodernist."43 If this
characterization is true, a nation of such men could do nothing to
improve the overall composition of mankind, let alone become a race
of Ubermenschen themselves.
Anti-Semitism
Probably the most common way in which Nietzsche has been
differentiated from the Nazis has been by documenting their
41Adelheid von Saldern, "Cultural Conflicts, Popular Mass Culture, and the
Question of Nazi Success," 323.
42Ibid.
43Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 79.
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respective attitudes toward anti-Semitism. Nietzsche had nothing but
scorn for anti-Semites, and the Nazis made their living by exploiting
anti-Semitism. No two positions could stand further apart. Unlike
the Nazis, Nietzsche made clear distinctions between ancient and
modem Jews and Judaism. Yet most of Nietzsche's stereotypes made
reference to long-term cultural developments. In fact, his cultural
generalizations would not have been possible if not for millennia of
continuities within Jewish culture. Like the-Nazis, but for far more
profound historical reasons, Nietzsche generally regarded the Jews as
morally, culturally, economically, and even intellectually distinct
from the rest of Europe. Unlike the Nazis, Nietzsche portrayed the
Jews' distinctiveness in very nuanced and detailed terms.
Nietzsche felt that as "a race still in need of having their heads
washed first," (GSC 291) the Germans continued to lack the
intelligence to get over their historic anti-Semitism. He proposed to
"eject all anti-Semitic ranters from the country" (BGE 183). "Let in
no more Jews! Thus commands the instinct of a people whose type is
still weak and undetermined" (BGE 182). For Nietzsche, the Jews
were a more creative race than the Germans in the sense that they
had gained an instinctual resiliency in response to historic
oppression. Nietzsche wrote of their "higher intelligence," their
holding fast to the "banner of Enlightenment and intellectual
independence," and their advocacy of a "rational explanation o f the
world. "44 He describes them as a people with "the toughest vital
energy, " (ATC 593) whose accumulated wisdom had contributed
irreplaceably to the intellectual supremacy of Europe. "May heaven
have mercy on the European intellect if one wanted to subtract the
Jewish intellect from it."45 Nietzsche said that his experiences with
Jews had "aroused in me the highest expectations from young men of
this origin."46 As the strongest people in Europe, Nietzsche felt that
they added an element of "the most conserving power in our
intensely threatened and insecure Europe" (W P 462). Consequently,
44Michael F. Duffy & Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews,"
Journal of the History of Ideas 49, no,2 (1988): 304.
45Ibid., 312.
46Ibid., 303.
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if they indeed did want to be the ruling caste of Europe (as many
anti-Semites theorized) they easily could, that much was certain. But'
"that they are not planning and working towards that is equally
certain" (BGE 182).
Nietzsche's thoughts on the Jews represent an important but
subordinate aspect o f his thought. The Nazi regard for the Jewish
intellect needs little introduction, and serves as the ultimate source
for all of their ideology. The thousands o f comments made by Hitler
about Jews in Mein K am pf did not contain a single complimentary
observation. For him, nothing good could ever come from a Jew,
and everything bad has resulted from Jews. This is the consummate
anti-Semitism. Hitler went well beyond hating Jews. He convinced
himself that they were what was wrong with the world. Hitler
popularized the use of the word Untermenschen as an antithesis to
Nietzsche's dream of Ubermenschen. For Hitler, the consummate
race o f subhumans were the Jews, so he clearly either did not read
his Nietzsche closely, or more likely, he simply ignored what he did
not like.
Hitler's conception of Jews and Judaism encapsulate a great
number of crude errors and ironies. He claims that in their
"specifically Jewish way of thinking . . . intolerance and fanaticism
incorporates the very Jewish nature."47 In Mein Kampf, Hitler
repeatedly refers to them variously as "slick, wily, deceptive,
guileful, shrewd, sly, and cunning." By portraying the Jews as a
singularly adroit people, he makes his conspicuously spotty evidence
against them seem more palatable. The Nazis' fear began with a deep
suspicion of Jewish intellectual life. Hitler said that "their
intellectual abilities were schooled in the course of centuries. Today
the Jew is looked upon as 'clever,' and in a certain sense he has been
so at all times."48 Ultimately, centuries of Jewish deception aimed to
"break the people's volkish and national spine, in order to make it

47Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf . 67.
48Ibid., 412.
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ripe for the yoke o f slavery of international capital and its masters,
the Jews."49
The contradictory notions that the Jews could make use of
their cunning through "superior genius,"50 and at the same time
bottom-feed as Untermenschen is never made clear in Mein Kampf.
We are merely supposed to have faith that as "the Jew forms the
strongest contrast to the A ryan,"51 his instincts lean toward
destruction rather than creation, and internationalism as opposed to
nationalism. To accomplish his diabolical goals, the Jew mesmerizes
the mass working populations of the world with the charlatanry of
the Marxist religion. The "Jewish mind" could be used to explain
any malevolent development, including the their own guileful plan to
conquer the world, or the periodic cultural impotence of the German
people. Says Nazi Foreign Minister Reitlinger, "The advance of
Jewish influence and of the corrupting Jewish mentality in politics,
economics, and culture paralyzed the German people's strength and
will to rise again."52 For some Nazis, such as Ernst Rohm, "Jew
baiting was merely a highly effective form of drumming up
prejudice against the hated Republic."53 For most major Nazi
officials, however, conspiracy theories about the Jews and their
intellectual challenge were inherent and central to the Nazi view of
the world.
Among all the peoples of the earth, why did the Nazis singleout the Jews for their most venomous invectives, and as objects of
their revenge? The Nazis understood the Jews to be historically pre
disposed toward an internationalism, and this, of course, conflicted
with the interests of the German Volk. Since the Diaspora, the Jews
had been forced to find homes everywhere but their original
homeland. Their resultant rootlessness had dulled their national
instinct. Through internationalism, they wished to rob each nation
of the world of a connection to its native soil the way that they had
49Ibid., 331.
50Ibid., 446.
51Ibid., 412.
52Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 87.
53Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 414.
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once been robbed. Zionism was used as a cover for more insidious
international ambitions. Rosenberg formulated this sentiment in his
Detmold Address on January 15, 1939, as follows: "The Jewry is
striving today for a Jewish state in Palestine. Not in order to offer a
home to Jews all over the world, however, but for other reasons:
world Jewry has to have a little miniature state in order to send
extraterritorial ministers and representatives to all countries o f the
world and through them to promote its lust for dom ination."54
Hitler felt that this was to "prepare the ground for its domination of
the truly international finance and stock exchange capital."55
W hether under the guise of capitalism, or Marxism, the goal
of the Jew was the same: he must use politics and ideology to, in the
words of Goebbels, "devour all peoples."56 He is "tactically clever"
and "intelligent" enough to pander to "merchant instincts" where he
can capitalize on them, and to "Bolshevik rhetoric" where it is to his
benefit.57 Having lost his instinct for nationhood, the "eternal
wandering Jew" (an oft repeated phrase of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries) had to attain his own progress always at
the expense o f other nations. Exploitation of the other nations o f the
earth could best be accomplished by first eliminating all national
instincts. This is where the Marxist component o f the international
Jewish conspiracy comes into play. Hitler believed that despite their
rootlessness, he could "expose the inner connectedness"58 of the
Jewish people and their link with Bolshevism.
For Hitler, Marx was not singular among Jews in his dream of
undermining nationhood around the world. Marx is the rule, a mere
example of what all Jews are about. "In the service o f his race . . .
Karl Marx was really only one among millions who, in the swamp of
a gradually decomposing world, recognized, with the keen eye of a

54Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 93.
55Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 289.
56Joseph Goebbels, "National Socialism or Bolshevism?," From Edward
Dimondberg, Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, The Weimar Source Book (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994), 128.
57Ibid., 128.
58Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 424.
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prophet, the most essential poison elements and rendered them into a
concentrated solution for the quicker destruction o f the independent
existence of the free nations of this earth."59 Hitler acknowledged
the need to fight Marxism independently of the Jews, insofar as it
could be construed as a genuine ideology. Yet for Hitler, Marxism
was nothing but a crafty tool of the conspiring international Jewry.
As "the personification of the Devil, as the symbol of all evil,
assumes the living appearance of the Jew ,"60 it should come as no
surprise that "his crown will become the funeral wreath of humanity,
and once again this planet, empty of mankind, will move through the
ether as it did thousands of years ago."61 All of this may constitute
an ideology. Either way, it appears contradictory when compared
with Hitler's assertion, also in Mein Kam pf that "in my opinion, the
language of the anti-Semitic Viennese press was unworthy of the
cultural traditions of a great race."62
The malevolent root of this Nazi rhetoric could not contrast
more sharply with the source of Nietzsche's opinions. Nietzsche felt
that Jewish creativity stemmed from a cultural tradition of a
uniquely spiritual people. "Esprit: quality of late races: Jews,
Frenchmen, Chinese. (The anti-Semites do not forgive the Jews for
possessing 'spirit1—and money. Anti-Semites—another name for the
'underprivileged')" (W P 460). The original evidence,of the creative
spirit of the Jews lay in the beauty of the literature of "The Old
Testament, the book of divine justice, things and speeches of so
grand a style that Greek and Indian literature have nothing to set
beside it. One stands in reverence and trembling" (BGE 79). Within
this testament lay also a testament to a people capable of cultural
refinement through tradition and shared wisdom. By "their instinct
for the chosen," (W P 116) their "ability to elevate their God," (ATC
616) and "endurance in fearful situations and psychological and

59Ibid., 579.
60Ibid., 447.
61Ibid., 84.
62Ibid., 68.
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spiritual resources,"63 the Jews had developed a "great heroic
tendency"64 which the other peoples of Europe had yet to
comprehend.
Nietzsche's as a Detractor o f the Jews
In an attempt to rescue Nietzsche from the label of "protoNazi," many historians and philosophers have made light of the many
ways in which Nietzsche's piercing vision lent itself to helping the
Nazis clarify their own often murky ideologies. As an example,
scholars often circumvent Nietzsche's more unflattering portraits of
the Jews. Because o f his flattering comments regarding the Jews,
and his detestation of anti-Semites, Nietzsche has often been shrouded
in such hyperbole as the great "anti-anti Semite." Yet such labels
willfully steer clear of the evidence. Nietzsche put no group on a
pedestal above criticism, and the Jews were no exception. He wrote
for himself, and spared no feelings in the stereotypes that he coined.
Many of his biting observations offended the sensibilities o f people
during his day. Many continue to offend people who read them.
And while his willingness to promote negative stereotypes should be
noted, it must also be remembered that were Nietzsche's powers of
observation less keen, many of the compliments that he bestowed on
entire peoples would never had been made either. The Nazis'
portrayals of the Jews were, by-and-large, distorted, biased,
ignorant, and brimming with animus. Still, history has shown that
they borrowed heavily from Nietzsche to provide articulation,
potency, and sting when their own collective intellects often
produced only platitudes. Though most scholars would agree with
Michael Duffy's assertion that "Nietzsche's comments on the Jews
present an important aspect of his thought,"65 the ways in which
these comments have been influential remains an almost
systematically avoided topic.

63Michael F. Duffy & Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews,"
305.
64Ibid.
65Ibid., 310.
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To Nietzsche, the Jews were "the strangest people in world
history" (ATC 592). Their history made them strange. Despite
their resilience, the Jews started on a path toward decadence due to
the dogma o f the Pharisees (ATC 596). After that, Christianity
resulted from the Jewish historical experience and their feelings of
ressentiment.66 For Nietzsche, Christians have embodied decadence
and ressentiment, and these they inherited from the early Jews.
Often spread by such Christians, the Jews' cultural anomalies have
been developing for thousands o f years. Unlike the Nazis, Nietzsche
did not attribute the Jews' vices to innate racial flaws.
Like all great thinkers, Nietzsche went through a period o f
acute impressionability during which he took in the prevailing ideas
and attitudes of his day. His relationship with Richard W agner is a
key example of this period. Many of his utterances or writings about
Jews, particularly from this early period, reflect the prevailing,
though intellectually questionable conventional wisdom of the day
regarding Jews. Many comments, especially ones made during his
twenties, can be described only as petty.
Yirmiyahu Yovel's book Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and
the Jews is an excellent source for Nietzsche's seemingly racist
remarks. It has often been noted that Nietzsche's sister Elizabeth,
who became Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche when she married a
prominent anti-Semite, is largely responsible for the unjust
reputation Nietzsche has received as a proto-Nazi. It has been said
that she did all she could to convince the public that Nietzsche's
ideals were near to her own: she was a rabid nationalist, anti-Semite,
and was obsessed with eugenics. If her reputation as the distorter of
Nietzsche is correct, it could not be based on many o f the letters
written by Nietzsche to Elizabeth, especially between age 22 and 28.
In one such letter, Nietzsche states that "Gersdorff (a friend) and I
discovered a pub where we can be alone and don't have to enjoy
melted butter and watch Jewish faces." In a letter to W agner, when
he was 25, Nietzsche declared that "Jewish greed" was "one o f the
66From Webster's II New College Dictionary. "General resentment and often
hostility harbored by one person or group against another, e s p .
ch ro n ica lly and with no m eans o f d irect expression.
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"causes of Germany's decline." Again to W agner in 1870, he
complained of "Jewishness in music," and "the Judaized press."
Yovel also cites an instance in which Nietzsche avoided speaking to
an acquaintance, one Dr. Volkmann, "because he was dressed with an
appalling lack of taste, like some theatrical Jew," and stated in a
letter to his mother that a fellow member of a hiking expedition was
"unfortunately a Jew ."67
The above quotations appear in Yovel's chapter entitled "The
Anti-Anti Semite," and Yovel dismisses his own citations as
indicative only o f the "immature" Nietzsche. He chooses instead to
emphasize the break that Nietzsche made with his past when he
passed into his "mature" stage in which no anti-Semitic or even antiJewish tracts could supposedly be found. Yovel's position is
indicative of the puzzlingly skewed history o f interpreting Nietzsche.
W hether the Nazis willfully ignored material that lacked utility to
their cause, or whether today's intellectuals willfully ignore material
by Nietzsche that does not suit his reinvented image since World W ar
II, distorted assertions have been made about the character of
Nietzsche's writing that lack legitimacy in light of a close reading of
his works. This includes Yovel's insistence that Nietzsche ceased his
criticism of the Jews during his "mature" period. In The Antichrist
alone (1888), Nietzsche not only made anti-Jewish comments, but
notably un-intellectual ones. W hether referring to "superlative little
Jews, ripe for every kind of madhouse," or the apostle Paul— "the
eternal wandering Jew par excellence," or simply asserting that Jews
"smell bad," a clear pattern is shown to exist throughout Nietzsche's
writings (ATC 625,622,649). Nietzsche clearly made a wide variety
of comments about the Jews, both positive and negative and varying
in quality, from the beginning of his intellectual career to the end.
Despite voluminous evidence to the contrary, Nietzsche
scholars have been persistent in taking the position, emblemized here
by Michael Duffy, that Nietzsche is "strongly and consistently anti-

67Yirmiyahu Yovel, Dark Riddle: Hegel. Nietzsche, and the Tews. 120-121. All
of the quotations from this paragraph can be found on these pages in Yovel’s
book.
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anti-Semitic."68 Mosse sanguinely points out that Nietzsche's 1879
article "A word about our Jews,' placed his prestige at the disposal of
the anti-Semitic movement."69 Yovel too paints the "Nietzsche as the
great anti-anti-Semite" portrait with as broad a stroke as possible. It
was the Old Testament Judaism, whose "grandeur Nietzsche adored;
the 'priestly' Judaism of the Second Temple, which he profoundly
despised and condemned as the parent of Christian culture; and the
post-Christian Judaism of the Jews in the Diaspora and in modem
times, whom he defended, admired, and saw as a healing ingredient
in his 'new Europe."70 This characterization too shall be shown as
highly exaggerated.
A vital distinction needs to be made. While Nietzsche had
nothing good to say about anti-Semites or anti-Semitism, his largely
negative portrayal of Jews and Judaism should disqualify him from
the title o f "the father of all anti-anti-Semites." The willful
ignorance about Nietzsche's unflattering remarks regarding the Jews
is curious and suspicious. It marks a major component of the
selective citation of his works since World War II, which has led to a
skewed reception of his philosophy in modem times.
Yovel's characterization of Nietzsche's reception of the Jews as
patently positive, excepting the period of the Second Temple, is
easily disproven. While Nietzsche made distinctions between ancient
and modem Jews and Judaism, he also draws attention to historic
continuities. For instance, Nietzsche does assert that the
characteristics of "impotence and envious hatred" distinguish "the
Jews of the prophetic era" from Jews of other eras.71 Yet Nietzsche
concurs with Tacitus that the Jews are "a people born for slavery"
(BGE 118). Hence, he finds no irony in the fact that the Jews,
"greedy, slavish," and "motivated by impotence, and envious hatred,"
were responsible for "inaugurating the slave rebellion in morals."
68Michael F. Duffy & Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews,"
317.
1
69George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins o f rhp
Third Reich (New York: Grosset and Dunalp, 1964), 200.
70Yirmiyahu Yovel, Dark Riddle: Hegel. Nietzsche, and the Tews. 117.
71 Michael F. Duffy & Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews,"
312.
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Nietzsche calls them "the best haters there have ever been."72
Because "in every Jew's possession" lies the "coldest self-possession,"
the Jews have set a new standard for the infliction of revenge upon
their enemies.73 Due to their "ressentiment," it was the Jews'
"revenge to elevate Jesus extravagantly, and to sever him from
themselves," and through his martyrdom to impose the slave
morality on the entire world. By such methods have "superlative
little Jews" (ATC 622) perfected the art of revenge as "an
extenuation of their usury."74 These opinions are not directed at one
limited period in Jewish history. These are characterizations of the
Jews as they have developed culturally from antiquity to the modem
day. Duffy, who characterizes Nietzsche as "consistently anti-anti
Semitic," mystifyingly makes the following generalization about
Nietzsche's writings on the Jews. "Nietzsche not only demonstrated a
dislike of the German Jews of his day, he also expressed an antipathy
toward Judaism in general."75 No such thinker can seriously be
regarded as the consummate "anti-anti-Semite."
While castigating all (including the Jews) who have historically
been driven by a thirst for revenge, Nietzsche does express his
understanding for the Jew s’ vengefulness. In The Antichrist,
Nietzsche explains his absolution of the Jews on the grounds that
their vengefulness signposts a "non plus ultra of historic genius"
(ATC 592). In The Case o f Wagner, Nietzsche justifies the Jews'
vengeance as necessary for "the preservation of their self-respect.76
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche even refers to "revengefulness"
as a "strong, high," and "passionate" drive perhaps worthy of
"cultivation" (BGE 183). Numerous other instances could be cited.
But more than anything, Nietzsche despised ressentiment, and he saw
it more in the Jews than in any other people. It was the Jewish
resentment against stronger races at the time of their ancient decay

72Ibid., 305,307,309,310.
73Ibid., 305.
74Ibid., 305.
75Ibid., 302
76Ibid., 305.
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that resulted in their "slave revolt in morals," Christianity. This was
a cultural blow from which the world may never recover.
"In the hands of the Jewish priests the great age in the history
of Israel became an age of decay" (ATC 596). Herein began the
chicanery of the Jews that led to the poisonous slave revolt in morals.
According to Nietzsche, the Jewish priesthood falsified the concept
of God, (ATC 595) culminating in the "history of Israel as the
denaturing of all values" (ATC 594). By virtue o f their emerging
impotence among peoples, "their hatred grew to monstrous and
uncanny proportions."77 To Nietzsche, this never would have
happened had they not lost the vital instinct for hierarchy, caste, and
race. Since they did, they predictably founded Christianity,
representing the counter-movement to any morality of
breeding, of race, of privilege: it is the anti-Aryan
religion par excellence. Christianity—the revaluation of
all Aryan values, the victory of chandala values, the
gospel preached to the poor and base, the general revolt
of all the downtrodden, the wretched, the failures, the
less favored, against "race": the undying chandala hatred
as the religion o f /ove (TWI 505).
In other words, the decadence of the ancient Jews has given way to
the victory of a Judeo-Christian tradition which has assaulted the
"master morality" and everything noble, and has ensured a perpetual
victory parade for the morality of the slave. For this, Nietzsche
would never forgive the ancient Jews, or their descendants. "It was
the Jews who started the slave revolt in morals; a revolt with two
millennia of history behind it, which w'e have lost sight of today
simply because it has triumphed so completely" (GM 168). This
strikingly presages a definitively Nazi conception of the Jews: Their
corrosive effects on culture must be feared all the more because they
are hidden from view.
Throughout his writings, Nietzsche consistently characterizes
the Jews as a people with a time-honored tradition of cunning and
77Friedrich Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals, from Michael F. Duffy &
Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews," 313.
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guile. "It is really high time to ask: What good actor today is not—a
Jew" (WP 317)? Nietzsche comes back to this idea throughout The
Will to Power, even in Kaufmann's translation.
People of the basest origin, in part rabble, outcasts not
only from respectable society, raised away from even
the smell of culture, without discipline, without
knowledge, without the remotest suspicion that there is
such a thing as conscience in spiritual matters; simply—
Jews: with an instinctive ability to create an advantage,
a means of seduction out o f every superstitious
supposition, out of ignorance itself (WP 117).
To a certain extent, Nietzsche associated the instinct for race
and caste with the instinct for culture. The same could be said o f his
distinguished colleague and friend Jacob Burckhardt, but no one
seems to be insisting that Burckhardt was a proto-Nazi. Nietzsche
simply felt that the Jews had traded a degree of their culture for a
degree of guile that opposed all nobility. As they lost their caste
system, they lost their instinct for aristocracy as the "good."
Consequently, that which had hitherto been slavish had been "bad,"
but now became the "good." W e still live with this legacy.
The Jews tried to prevail after they had lost two of their
castes, that of the warrior and that of the peasant; in this
sense they are the 'castrated': they have the priests—and
then immediately the chandala . . . the origin of
Christianity . . . Because they knew the warrior only as
their master, they brought into their religion enmity
toward the noble, toward the exalted and proud, toward
power, toward the ruling orders . . . That is why the
French Revolution is the daughter and continuation of
Christianity—its instincts are against caste, against the
noble, against the last privileges (W P 111).
All of this discussion of Jewish cultural traits must not be confused
with the Nazi desire to confer upon the Jews innate racial flaws. For
Nietzsche, the Jews' cultural virtues accompany profound,
historically nurtured cultural imperfections. A slavish guile,
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developed in response to the demise of their caste instinct, has made
the Jews the epitome o f incompleteness in human existence,
especially in the West. This has culminated in a "disbelief in 'higher
man'" (ATC 599). Again, this relates back to how poorly, as a
people, they compare with the ancient Greeks and the Greek outlook
on life.
The Greeks . . . in their desire to invent some dignity
for sacrilege and to incorporate nobility in it, they
invented tragedy—an art form and a pleasure that have
remained essentially and profoundly foreign to the Jew,
in spite of all his poetic gifts and his sense for the
sublime. . . . The Jews feel that they are the chosen
people among all the nations because they are the moral
genius among nations (because they had a more
profound contempt for the human being in themselves
than any other people) . . . . Nobility had surrendered
all of its power and had become contemptible (GSC
188).
The level of nuance present in Nietzsche's and the Nazis'
respective intellectual treatments of the Jews should be enough to
distinguish them. Regardless of his intentions, however, Nietzsche's
treatment of the Jews lent itself to the Nazis' ideology in two
fundamental ways. By painting such a detailed picture of the Jews,
Nietzsche created an articulate catalogue of detailed slogans about the
Jews. This became dangerous in the hands of anyone who wished to
edit creatively Nietzsche's overall portrait o f them. Secondly, by
justifying what he viewed as historic Jewish vengefulness through the
ressentiment of the slave morality, Nietzsche made the idea of
vengeance upon the Jews seem more justifiable. Large tracts of
Nietzsche's work run directly counter to Nazi thought. Other tracts,
including some on the Jews, could easily be incorporated by the
Nazis with no need to misappropriate his words.
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Chapter Hit
Nietzsche as the Embodiment of National Socialism
The issue of anti-Semitism, w hile important, represents only
one possible category of comparison between the ideologies of
Nietzsche and the Nazis. Certainly, racially motivated Nazi antiSemitism differs sharply from Nietzsche's negative cultural
observations about a people for whom he also had much admiration.
Yet the problem with the traditional interpretation of the issue, for
those who have dismissed the Nietzsche-Nazi link, has been to focus
almost exclusively on their respective treatments of the Jews.
Nietzsche's and the Nazi's respective treatments of the Jews are
obviously distinguishable. Still, when a comparison of their
ideologies is fimited to this particular topic, a specious dismissal of
their ideological connection seems inevitably to follow. Another
relevant issue, almost completely ignored by scholars, is a
comparison of Nietzsche's and the Nazis' respective visions for a
future European society.
Nietzsche called for new cultures built on the foundation of
creative individuals. The Nazis demanded that individuals conform
and relinquish their creative powers for the betterment of the group.
Nietzsche detested the increasing conformity and blandness of the
individual in mass society. For him, socialism consummated this
trend. Hitler demanded socialism so that the individual would be
easier to mold. Nietzsche saw German society, conformist and
susceptible to dogma, capitulating to simple-minded explanations of
race-thinking that led to a shallow and unconstructive nationalism.
Hitler exploited and quickened feelings of extreme national pride to
acquire a maniacal following, and wished to reduce all thinking to
issues of race. Nietzsche relentlessly criticized the Germans. Hitler
insisted that they were the master race. Nietzsche had mixed feelings
about the Jews, as he had about all peoples. Hitler saw everything
wrong in the world emanating from the Jews. Nietzsche dreamed of
a race cultured to be great, not indoctrinated to be so. The Nazis'
truths were normally rigid and narrow, Nietzsche's truths were
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nuanced. Clearly, the Nazis did not merely emulate Nietzsche.
Clearly, many wide ideological chasms separate their ideologies.
Consequently, it may seem shocking to notice how very much
common ground they shared ideologically, nonetheless. The
meaning of Steven Aschheim's assertion that "Nietzsche provided a
fruitful source for . . . visions o f a post-liberal, post-M arxist,
national regeneration"1 might seem mystifying given the material
examined so far. Y et while Nietzsche detested his contemporary
political organizations as harbingers of mediocrity, and while he
found politics boring, he knew that many would try to incorporate
his ideas into politics. In the words of Zeev Stemhell, "Even the
most abstract ideas of Nietzsche and Heidegger had immediate
political application, and they knew it."2 Nietzsche believed that the
realization of his ideas would not be possible for many millennia, but
he tempted the brave to fuse an heroic past with a supra-human
future. Nietzsche stood for hierarchy, warrior aristocracy, the
isolated community (in the spirit of the polis) and to a degree, for
the sanctity of race. More strikingly, he advocated slavery, violence,
pitilessness, and more "evil." While Nietzsche did not believe in the
existence of evil, he believed that what Western Culture had hitherto
perceived as evil was in short supply in modem Europe. To the
extent that the Nazis shared these values with Nietzsche, a world of
likenesses between them remains to be explored, despite their more
obvious differences.
The Essence o f the Vision
The 1980's, and especially the 1990's have been witness to an
explosion in Nietzsche scholarship. Alan Megill and Steven
Aschheim have emerged among the most potent breakers o f the
disfigured molds into which Nietzsche has been placed since World
W ar II. While not technically a "Nietzsche scholar," Francis
Fukuyama dealt heavily with Nietzsche in his famous 1992 book, The
End o f History and the Last Man,. Perhaps better than anyone,

1Steven E. Aschheim, "Nietzschean Socialism -- Left and Right," 148.
2Peter Bergmann, Nietzsche. The Last Antipolitical German. 252.
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Fukuyama has made clear the extent o f Nietzsche's detestation for
modernity in all its forms. "It was Nietzsche's greatest fear that 'the
American way of life' should be victorious."3 Much of the
extremity in Nietzsche's writing can be traced back to his belief that
anything would be better than liberal-democratic societies, and their
pacifism, presumption of universal equality, and feminism.
Nietzsche had no doubt that only such societies could emerge in the
wake of the absolute and irreversible victory of the slave morality.
For Nietzsche, no greater catastrophe could befall mankind.
Francis Fukuyama focuses on the undemocratic, anti-liberal,
militaristic, anti-feminist, anti-egalitarian Nietzsche. Fukuyama sees
Nietzsche's agenda as a warning o f an impending global uni-culture
of liberal-democratic "men without chests, a society of bourgeois
who aspired to nothing more than their own comfortable selfpreservation."4 W hether one despises or admires liberal-democratic
forms of government, one must acknowledge that their hegemony
has progressed even since the time of Nietzsche. And Fukuyama
draws attention to how close we have come to the realization of
Nietzsche's nightmare. Now, "One has to learn a new set of
democratic values: to be 'participant,' 'rational,' 'secular,' 'mobile,'
'empathetic,' and 'tolerant."5 These are all qualities o f Fukuyama's
"Last Men," and "virtues" that Nietzsche despised as the source of
"good" in the herd, slave morality. These "democratic" values, for
Nietzsche, and for that matter Hitler, can only be attained at the
expense of noble, aristocratic, master values. Says Fukuyama, "The
desire for glory (among people like Alexander, Caesar, or
Napoleon), and that inordinate stirring to be better than others— is
no longer an acceptable way to describe one's goals. It is in fact a
characteristic we attribute to people that we don't like . . . like
H itler."6 For Nietzsche, the desire for glory, and to be better than
others, is the most indispensable ingredient for the preservation or

3Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. 320.
4Ibid., 188.
5Ibid., 24.
6Ibid., 190.
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creation of higher types, and the most natural instinct in our human
nature.
There are certain strong and dangerous drives, such as
enterprisingness, foolhardiness, revengefulness, craft,
rapacity, ambition . . . mightily developed and cultivated
. . . these drives are now felt to be doubly dangerous. . .
step by step the herd instinct draws its conclusions . . .
here again fear is the mother of morality (BGE 183).
To the "men without chests," Fukuyama points out that
Nietzsche vastly prefers the ancient pagans, the "beasts with red
cheeks."7 Such men took what they wanted instinctively, paid high
prices for the preservation of their pride, and had no conception
whatsoever o f what "humanity" or "human rights" could possibly
mean. Nietzsche observed that as history witnessed these "beasts
with red cheeks" giving way to "men without chests," progressively
fewer Caesars, Napoleons, Bachs and Mozarts were being produced.
Nothing could be worse. Consequently, anything that stood in the
way of such a world must be preferable to what is happening.
Fukuyama observes that among modem political ideologies, only the
Fascist-Nazi perspective has proclaimed a desire to reverse the
perceived corrosive effects of "liberty, equality, and fraternity."
In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche taught that man is a
"bridge" between the animals and "Ubermenschen," translated as
either "Overmen" or "Supermen." "Man is something that shall be
overcome. What have you done to overcome him? . . . What is ape
to man? A laughingstock or a painful embarrassment. And man
shall be just that for the Overman" (ZAR 124). The emergence of
this race of "Superbeings" represented Nietzsche's highest hope. As
previously alluded to, such people would appear as a cross between a
pride o f lions, a cultured aristocracy, and a tribe of artistic geniuses.
They would act on instinct, and most importantly, always without
remorse or guilt. They would take slaves for the greater fulfillm ent
of their own lives, and would recognize and maintain an instinct for
7Ibid., 162.
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race and breeding as required for their culture's preservation. Since
going back is impossible, the unforseeable aesthetic splendor of the
Supermen would have no equivalent in history. Y et culturally, a
Superman's regard for him self and those of his ethnic culture would
resemble the ancient Greeks, only intensified. "I sought in history
the beginnings o f this construction of reverse ideals (the concepts
'pagan,' 'classical,1 'noble' newly discovered and expounded—)" (W P
537). Still, humanity's low point, modernity, must somehow be
overcome.
Men not high or hard enough for the artistic
refashioning of mankind . . . have hitherto ruled over
the destiny of Europe, until at last a shrunken, almost
ludicrous species, a herd animal, something full of good
will, sickly and mediocre has been bred, the European
of today (BGE 89).
Social Darwinism
Nazi ethics are easily traced to the late nineteenth-century
application of science to sociology. Then, thinkers such as H.S.
Chamberlain applied Darwin's idea o f natural selection to the study
of humans to explain the seeming chasms of cultural development
between the races. As Darwin had created a hierarchy of plants and
animals in the natural world, Herbert Spencer and other Social
Darwinists popularized a ranking of the human races, based
ostensibly on their respective capacity for culture and intelligence.
Social Darwinism benefited the twentieth century reactionary right •
in a number of ways.
One, the budding nineteenth century impulse to harmonize the
races, led by the abolitionists, was severely undermined. Racism was
no longer hampered by its irrational motivations in an increasingly
rationalizing world. Science had logicized and seemingly confirmed
the elitist suspicions of white racists. Two, the universal idea of a
single mankind, advanced in various ways by liberals, Christians, and
socialists alike, now had to overcome a new enemy in the form of
scientific racism. For Marxists in particular, scientific racism
contradicted the eternal truth of dialectical progress. Achieving the
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proletarian utopia depended on people's increased recognition of
humanity's kinship. Increased recognition o f racial difference
worked against the crusade for world unity. Three, by demarcating
races into species in the way that one would classify animals,
scientific racism made competition between races, rather than
cooperation between them, seem perfectly natural. Survival of the
fittest came to mean survival o f the fittest species, or race. This
point o f view helped fuel the militarism of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, as European national groups also came to
view each other in a competition for survival. Taken to its logical
conclusion, Social Darwinism can only end in widespread
"interspecies" conflict, and war.
The implications of scientific racism severely antagonized all
universal values, but particularly the ideals of the left. Pacifism^
egalitarianism, human brotherhood, and the ideal of the sovereign
individual all conflicted with the militarism, tribalism, idealization of
hierarchy, and intensified nationalism that logically progressed from
Spencer's model. By positing such a striking antipode to the ideals
of the far left, scientific racism naturally contributed significantly to
the twentieth century reactionary right.
The application of the ethic of "survival o f the fittest" in Nazi
Germany extended Well beyond the infamous Nazi advocacy of racial
warfare. Hitler even euthanized 70 000 Germans. In the words of
George Mosse, this showed definitively that "the Nazis took the idea
of 'unworthy' life seriously."8 Similarly for Nietzsche, "the struggle
against the brutal instincts is different from the struggle against the
sick instincts" (W P 138). For leftists, both sickness and brutality are
curable diseases, at least in theory. For both Nietzsche and Hitler,
sickness must be attacked as evidence of weakness. Brutality is
almost the opposite of sickness as it represents a fundamental instinct,
and the "fitness" and dominance of the brutalizer.
The Social Darwinists were Nietzsche's contemporaries.
While his condemnation of anti-Semites remained relentless until His
death, Nietzsche seldom if ever condemns Social Darwinism.
8George Mosse, Toward the Final Solution. 219.
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Nietzsche criticized all, including the scientific racists, who wished to
rationalize everything in an already logocentric culture. Yet in the
sense that "'natural' has come to mean the same as 'contemptible,'
and 'bad'" (W P 141), Nietzsche and the scientific racists found
common cause by reconsidering the role of instinct in human
endeavors. Both wished to reintroduce the concept of universal
warfare, and eradicate the ideal of universal welfare. Natural
selection should once again define human relationships. Says
Nietzsche
In all the countries of Europe and likewise in America
there exists at present a very narrow, enclosed, chained
up s p e c ie s of spirits who desire practically the opposite
of that which informs our aims and in s tin c ts . . .
levellers, these falsely named 'free spirits' - eloquent
and tirelessly scribbling slaves for the democratic taste
and its 'modern ideas. What with all their might they
would like to strive after is the universal green pasture
happiness of the herd, with security, safety, comfort and
an easier life for all, and sy m p a th y fo r all
th a t su ffe rs (BG E 71-72).
The return to instinct, and the turning away from "the universal
green happiness of the herd" demonstrates Nietzsche's will to
permanently infuse competition, violence, and hierarchy into human
existence. During Nietzsche's day, these ideals were remarkably
fresh. Without question, the search for a nature-based understanding
of humanity, shared by Nietzsche and the Social Darwinists, began
near a remarkably similar date.
Race
Ideological similarities between Hitler and Nietzsche are
manifold, and many more shall be explored. But for an initial
analysis of the: common ground between their visions, the issue of
race must first be addressed. Had Nietzsche not tasted of the racethinking debauch of his day, no comparison of his ideas with those of
the Nazis would be warranted. Since with the Nazis all thinking
began with race-thinking, a vacuum o f such material in Nietzsche's
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writings would reduce any shared intellectual ground between the
two to sheer accident. As shown, Nietzsche categorically dismissed
anti-Semitism, and all maniacal nationalism. Still, he loathed these
trends in German culture not because he felt them to be evil, but
because dogmatic adherence to race-thinking inhibits creativity. In
fact, Nietzsche indisputably believed in the concept of racial value.
Virtually all Europeans during the late nineteenth century, including
Nietzsche, took the value of race for granted. Nietzsche only
objected to an obsession with race, and an all-encompassing, mindnumbing pride in it. Race can still have value as the creation of, or
foundation for great men. "Napoleon made nationalism possible,
that is its excuse" (WP 469).
Nietzsche did not view the Germans as his potential "Master
Race." In fact, he believed that no race currently existing on this
earth could turn itself into the Ubermenschen. Nietzsche also
thought that the Master Race could under no circumstances
materialize for thousands of years. "It is nothing to be wondered at
that a couple of millennia are needed to re-establish contact—a couple
of millennia mean little!" (W P 537) But the tenor of Nietzsche's
language lends itself to a cornucopia of race-thinking like no other
thinker in history. While Nietzsche did not center his thought
around race, he extensively articulated the ideological enticements of
race. Nietzsche's writings on race were not intended for proving the
superiority of one extant race over another. Rather, Nietzsche
extolled the role o f race as an indispensable piece in the puzzle of
great cultures.
All of the conjecture of his day about "race" lacked a most
fundamental ingredient, the necessity of breeding. All of the pseudo
scientific postulates, and circular arguments about racial hierarchy
meant nothing while Europeans paid no attention to breeding.
Nietzsche viewed the will to breed stronger types as a pillar upon
which all vital cultures have been built, and shall always be built.
Inattention to breeding has contributed to the end of great cultures.
This position is made clear in Twilight o f the Idols. "The
philosophers are the decedents of Greek culture, the counter
movement to the ancient, noble taste (to the agnostic instinct, to the
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polis, to the value of race, to the authority o f descent)" (TW I 559).
The passing of the cleanliness of the Greek aristocracy's bloodlines
marked the inevitable decline o f their culture. "For spirit alone does
not make noble; rather, there must be something to ennoble the
spirit.— What then is required? Blood" (W P 496). To Nietzsche, the
noble instinct for breeding had been vanquished by the decadent
spirit of democracy. The fragile "soul" o f the ancient Greeks
decayed as their inter-caste marriage taboos withered. Nietzsche
maintained the common nineteenth century intellectual position that
ethnic groups and races enjoyed discrete and fragile "souls." The
anomalies of ancient Greek culture could be explained, in part, by
the anomaly o f their genetics.
Partly due to his relationship with Wagner, Nietzsche espoused
a belief in the supremacy of the "Aryan soul" at the beginning o f this
academic career. He maintains this idea throughout The Birth o f
Tragedy. "The legend of Prometheus is indigenous to the entire
community of Aryan races and attests to their prevailing talent for
profound and tragic vision" (BT 63). As shown, many scholars have
attributed such attitudes to the folly of the "immature" Nietzsche
before he broke free of the influence of Wagner. Nietzsche’s
position certainly faded from that of the typical racist as his career
progressed, but he never stopped portraying ethnic stereotypes, in
the Wagnerian sense, as the supposed mirrors of mystical ethnic
souls.
"Evil men have no songs. How is it then that the Russians have
songs" (TWI 469). Here is an odd phrase coming from a selfproclaimed opponent of German nationalism. But it sheds light on
Nietzsche's ideological relationship with the Nazis. For who except
those on the far-right have unabashedly used ethnic stereotypes as a
s
concrete feature of their thought? And Nietzsche crafts a stereotype
for each of the nations o f Europe.
The English genius coarsens and makes natural
everything it takes up; The French makes thin,
simplifies, logicizes, adorns; The German confuses,
compromises, confounds and moralizes; The Italian has
made by far the freest and subtlest use of what it has
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borrowed, and introduced a hundred times more than it
took out of it: as the richest genius which had the most
to bestow (W P 438-439).
Lest one read these characterizations as mere cultural stereotypes,
Nietzsche makes clear that he sees them as stemming from profound
racial instincts. He views his own thought as a derivative, in part,
from his blood. "My ancestors were Polish noblemen: I have many
racial instincts from this source" (EH 7). The power o f blood
perseveres to maintain ethnic continuities for peoples over thousands
of years. "The concept of power, whether of a god or o f a man,
always includes both the ability to help, and the ability to harm.
Thus it is with the Arabs; thus with the Hebrews. Thus with all
strong races" (WP 193).
Nietzsche shows no compunctions about tracing cultural
phenomena to racial roots. For instance, in The Birth o f Tragedy,
he states that "The Platonic distinction between the idea and the
eidolon is deeply rooted in the Greek temperament." This position is
held firmly throughout his career, and carried right into his last
w ork, The Will to Power. For Nietzsche, what defined the Greeks'
collective soul, and their culture, was their overcoming of some
Asiatic racial instincts that might have rendered their culture
inferior. "The immoderate, disorderly Asiatic lies at his (the
Greek's) roots: the bravery of the Greek consists in his struggle
with his Asiaticism; beauty is not given to him, as little as is logic or
the naturalness of customs—it is conquered, willed, won by struggle—
it is his victory" (W P 540).
These same principles are also applied to the Germans.
Nietzsche does not attribute German cultural weakness to the impact
of the Reformation, the Thirty Years' War, or any other event. He
goes right to the root, to an innate Germanic lack of esprit. For
example, "It seems that their Catholicism is much more an intrinsic
part of the Latin races than the whole o f Christianity in general is of
us northerners . . . We northerners are undoubtedly descended from
barbarian races also in respect o f our talent for religion: we have
little talent for it" (BGE 77). If this were not a racial stereotype,
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why not just say "an intrinsic part of Latin culture"? The idea is that
talent, among peoples, either exists at a racial level or it does not.
"There are also peoples that are failures" (W P 467): Hence, the
accentuated importance of breeding as the only way to transcend
biological shortcomings. While Nietzsche's insistence that the
Germans are innately flaw ed at the biological level might seem to
contradict the Nazi insistence on German racial superiority, this falls
in line with Nietzsche's urge to end German nationalism as a craven
stupidity, the issue is a double-edged sword. For at the same time,
Nietzsche gives credence to a biological determinism and/or an
enhanced value to the concept of breeding. He also expands the
possibility that certain peoples might be innately flawed to an
irredeemable degree, depending on one's criteria.
As one might expect, Nietzsche's meditations on race, even his
stereotypes, were not intended for debates about racial hierarchies.
Nietzsche's racial stereotypes contribute to his portrait of the
importance of "racial instincts," and a belief that "the mixed race
man . . .will, on average, be a rather weak man" (BGE 121). In the
discrete breeding of Europe's aristocracy, he observed an
indispensable ingredient for culture. The purpose over his attention
to race was not to conjure up racial animus, but to draw attention to
natural instincts, and the need to nurture them. Still, when reading
his works, one must constantly bear in mind: what political ideology,
if not the Nazis', maintained convictions about the "natural order"
similar to these?
Skepticism arises . . . whenever races or classes long
separated from one another are decisively and suddenly
crossed. In the new generation, which has as it were
inherited varying standards and values in its blood, all is
unrest, disorder, doubt, experiment; the most vital
forces have a retarding effect, the virtues themselves
will not let one another grow and become strong,
equilibrium, center of balance, upright certainty are
lacking in body and soul. But that which becomes most
profoundly sick and degenerates in such hybrids is the
will: they no longer have any conception of
independence of decision. . . O ur Europe of today, the
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scene o f a senselessly sudden attempt at radical class and consequently race - mixture, is as a result skeptical
from top to bottom . . .like a cloud overcharged with
question marks (BGE 136-137).
Hence, the preservation of racial purity is valued by Nietzsche as a
natural instinct, which, like all instincts, should be adhered to. The
Europeans' failure to cultivate this instinct is another example of
their decay. "It lies in the instinct of a community (family, race,
herd, tribe) to feel that the conditions and desires to which it owes its
survival are valuable in themselves" (W P 127).
Clearly, Nietzsche viewed all instincts as evolutionary tools for
survival, and the racial instinct stood among these. To him, strong
races such as the Jews have historically remained strong by
spiritualizing the ethic of not marrying outside of race. Nietzsche
repeatedly refers to the "strong, intelligent, and vigorous races" (WP
85) throughout his writings, partially with reference to their
ostensible purity. Similarly, inattention to breeding results in a
chaos of will, spirit, and mind, which leads to exhaustion and
inevitable decadence. "The race is corrupted—not by its vices but by
its ignorance; it is corrupted because it did not recognize exhaustion
as exhaustion: mistakes about physiological states are the source of
all ills" (WP 34). Interestingly, Nietzsche sees a reciprocal
relationship between race-mixing and decadence. Races will not
relinquish their instincts to purity before becoming sick, and sickness
in turn makes races more susceptible to relinquishing their instincts.
"One understands nothing of the psychology of Christianity if one
takes it to be the expression o f a newly arisen national youthfulness
and racial invigoration. On the contrary: it is a typical form of
decadence, the moral hypersensitivity and hysteria of a sick
mishmash populace grown weary and aimless" (W P 109).
Nietzsche knew that the individual's capitulation to instinct is
not always good. A large potential for barbarous license existed in
primitive Dionysianism. Yet cultures that do not adhere to instinct,
particularly the master instincts, in religion, myth, custom, law, and
everyday society, either begin as slave cultures or end up as them.
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Therein lies the necessity of the Apollonian; the compulsion to keep
certain fundamental cultural foundations, such as race, relatively
static. For a master culture to choose change inevitably means that it
has chosen a slavish way of life. One either ascends or descends.
And for Nietzsche, as shown, the capitulation of a master race to
race-mixing inevitably results in spiritual chaos, and descension.
The Nazis pilfered these ideas; they did not need to "misuse"
them. And while the Nazis did look past Nietzsche's diatribes against
the Germans, they had little choice. W ere the Nazis to heed the
intellectual wisdom about the German people as conferred by
Nietzsche, they would have been forced to accept passively the
Germans' role as a culturally bankrupt people, virtually incapable or
overcoming a crippling Versailles Treaty. Everything else that
Nietzsche had said spurred them to act. The Nazis may have been
evil, but they were motivated by the same goals and revulsions as
Nietzsche. Their task was to awaken the Christian, democratic,
European herd-animal and remind him that in his soul of souls, he
was still a predator. The Nazis only had to reiterate to Germany's
veterans what they had learned in The Will to Power, a German's
second Bible in the trenches of W orld W ar I.
Overall view of the future European: the most intelligent
slave animals, very industrious, . . . multifarious,
pampered, weak o f will—a cosmopolitan chaos of affects
and intelligence. How could a stronger species raise itself
out of him? A species with classical taste? This means
strengthening, to visible happiness, to the terrible, the
courage o f psychological nakedness . . . To fight upward
out of that chaos to this form —requires a compulsion: one
must be faced with the choice of perishing or prevailing.
A dominating race can grow up only out of terrible and
violent beginnings. Problem: where are the barbarians of
the twentieth century? Obviously they will come into view
and consolidate themselves only after tremendous socialist
crises—they will be the element capable of the greatest
severity toward themselves and able to guarantee the most
enduring will (W P 464-465).
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Such words gave substance and form to the Nazi political anomaly.
While the Great W ar had made most of Europe war-weary, the
Nazis saw that a great war had not yet been fought for a higher
purpose. No one could say why Europe had bludgeoned itself
between 1914 and 1918. Europe had not been resurrected in a
Nietzschean sense, she had only slipped further into her malaise.
The Weimar Republic had not transcended the cultural decay of
Western Civilization. Increased democracy and inclusiveness, and
the greater will to pacifism had only redefined decadence in the
Nietzschean sense.
The Nazis' desire to redefine Western values resulted in the
Western redefinition of evil to encompass all things "Nazi." Yet for
Nietzsche and the Nazis, that which is "evil" is not necessarily
destructive, "The strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the
most to advance humanity" (GSC 79). So-called "bad" emotions,
such as "hatred, envy, covetousness, and lust for domination" are
actually the "most fundamental and essential in the total economy of
life" (BGE 53). "Everything good is the evil of form er days made
serviceable," (W P 530) and "history contains the gruesome fact that
the exhausted have always been mistaken for the fullest—and the
fullest for the most harmful" (W P 30). With Nietzsche, war,
slavery, aristocracy, paganism, heartlessness, and hardness are
preferable to peace, egalitarianism, democracy, Christianity, pity,
and comfort. That which is perceived to be evil in the modern
world is actually noble and good, that which is perceived to be good
is actually ignoble and bad. The values o f the modern world are
exactly wrong. The Nazis' reputation as the antithesis o f what is
good in our world undeniably gives them common cause with
Nietzsche, if only by default.
As might be expected, the Nazis conceived of each and every
ethnic group as having a "soul" of its own. These ethnic souls
expressed their unique features through their cultural anomalies. In
the words of Nietzsche scholar M ark W arren, "Nietzsche's political,
economic, and biological assumptions caused him to reduce all
modem political and economic causes of nihilism to cultural and
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biological ones."9 The Nazis were no different. Scholars often
search for the roots of cultural practices, and find at these roots,
other cultural practices. Every cultural, and ultimately political
issue can be traced to a root stemming from race and racial instinct.
Both Nietzsche and the Nazis found that if one searches long enough,
cultural explanations cannot beget cultural explanations.
Rosenberg often quoted Paul de Lagarde, one of the subjects
o f Fritz Stern's The Politics o f Cultural Despair. Both shared the
idea that "peoples are the thoughts of G od.”10 For example,
Rosenberg also believed that "African primitivism crept into central
Europe from the south, promoted by 'niggerized Americanism' and
French 'power politics." The second pincer against Europe was
supposedly formed by "Mongolian waves of bolshevism," besieging
Germany from the east, and threatening the "extermination of all
German cultural values."11 Nietzsche hated the incessant ramblers
of race, and he did not feel that the Germans shared values worthy of
defending. Still, Nazis like Rosenberg shared a unique point of view
with Nietzsche: Cultural issues ultimately stem from biological roots.
The same could be said of the following observation made by
Nazi theorist R.W. Darre.
In Germany until well into the nineteenth century, not
only the nobility, but also groups of craftsmen and
Germanic peasants very consciously pursued a policy of
selective breeding. It is surprising to discover in the old
traditions the extent to which German marriage laws
were filled with wisdom about the interdependence of
blood and culture, especially in those cases where the
Germans intentionally erected a blood barrier, as for
example toward the Slavs. Today our people seem to
have lost all this wisdom .1?

9Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 187.
10Alfred Rosenberg, The Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg. 114.
1iAlan E. Steinweis, "Weimar Culture and the Rise of National Socialism: The
Kampfbund fur deutsche Kultur," Central European History 24, no.4 (1991): 409.
12R.W. Darre, from Edward Dimondberg, Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, The Weimar
Source Book. 234.
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This quotation indicates the Nazi race mania. Also unlike the Nazis,
Nietzsche said remarkably little, either positive or negative, about
the Slavs. Still, he would have recognized Darre's "wisdom," and
the historical significance of these ancient Germanic taboos.
Similarities and dissimilarities could be listed ad nauseum. The point
is that a vein of similarity in thought between Nietzsche and the
Nazis is obvious. In spite of a half-century o f downplaying the
similarities between these ideologies, who besides Nietzsche and the
radical right-wing ever accept race as anything but a hindrance to
progress?
Nietzsche and the Nazis also shared a somewhat similar vision
about who would constitute the future master race. One should not
confuse the Nazi rhetoric about German superiority with the
assumption that "the Germans" meant only greater Germany per se.
The Nazis' racial vision incorporated all Germanic peoples,
including the predominantly Frankish French, and the Anglo-Saxon
British. The SS, despite its wildly idealistic picture of the ideal
racial prototype, did not give special consideration in its recruitment
to Germans over Norwegians, Swedes, Danes, N etherlander, or the
rest. In fact, SS recruitment posters in Scandinavia purposefully
likened the new steely-eyed SS man with the savage blond-beast of
Viking times. However Romantic such a likening may have been,
Nietzsche preferred such nostalgia to the W estern alternative of
perpetual effeminacy. "'A hard heart has W otan set in my breast,' it
says in an old Scandinavian saga: a just expression coming from the
soul of a proud Viking" (BGE 196). The SS was designed to be
more than an elite corps of secret police, key to the preservation of
the authoritarian regime. They were supposed to reflect the cream
of the racial stock of Germanic Europe and the forefathers of
Europe's future master race. As Germanic blood had scattered
across Europe for millenia, Europe's new aristocracy was to have a
pan-European origin.
Nietzsche appreciated such images. In fact, the SS officer
came closer to Nietzsche's ideal type for the re-foundation of Europe
than he might have dreamed possible so soon after his own time. In
the foundation of his totally "New Order," "Himmler, through
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Auslese (selection) and Zucht (breeding) wanted to cultivate a new
human type - a loyal, duty-committed, tough, and self-sacrificing
warrior-leader, scholar, and administrator all in one, who was
capable of coping with the enormous task that lay ahead."13 It must
also be noted that the racial fanaticism that accompanied the
formation o f the SS in theory did not materialize in fact. In spite of
his rhetoric, Hitler was nowhere near as fanatical about the racial
specifications of the SS as was Him m ler,14 and the aesthetic
specifications of the elite unit were softened as mandated by the
necessities o f the war.
In other words, in spite o f the cruelty and stupidity displayed
by the SS in its treatment of Slavs and Jews before and during the
war, the SS served a higher function than traditional images o f them
would suggest. The SS did not materialize as a country-club for sixfoot blue-eyed blondes. It represented the Nazis' core hope for a
new kind of man, based in large part on the.same extreme
specifications articulated by Nietzsche himself. The modern
conception of the SS is not that it was a stupid organization, but a
dangerous one founded on the profoundest evil. Nietzsche imagined
that his new European man would fight with bravery, rule with
discipline, obey with loyalty, and above all, exploit with great eviL
The European Man
A comparison between Nietzsche's and the Nazis' use o f race
and hierarchy yields many similarities, but some important
differences as well. Nietzsche clearly believed in the existence of
racial instincts as sublime intuitions that characterized ethnic groups
and helped to explain the anomalies o f each respective culture. The
mixing of these instincts in Europe, both between nations and
between classes (which for millennia had bred relatively discretely),
had led to a spiritual chaos and contributed to Europe's cultural
decline.

13Herbert F. Ziegler, Nazi Germany's New Aristocracy: The SS Leadership 19251939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 52.
14Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 78.
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The historical sense has come to us in the wake of the
mad and fascinating semi-barbarism into which Europe
has been plunged through the democratic mingling of
classes and races. . . The past of every form and mode
of life, of cultures that formerly lay close beside or on
top of one another, streams into us 'modem souls'
thanks to this mingling, our instincts now run back in all
directions, we ourselves are a kind o f chaos (BGE 152153).
And yet, "the spirit perceives its advantage in all this" (BGE
153). Nietzsche saw in Europe's decline the very seeds of its rebirth.
The very mingling o f Europe's classes and races will contribute to its
renewal, but patently not in a leftist, universalist sense in which
racial mingling will contribute to a hybrid human prototype, and a
united world free of racial or class struggle. For Nietzsche, racial
mingling in Europe had gone too far already. The only way to
correct the damage done would be to finish the jo b and create a new,
homogenized European prototype. This man will not be content to
take an equal place among the other nations of the world. This new
European will be outfitted for the domination of the world.
The homogenizing of European man is the great process
that cannot be obstructed: one should even hasten it.
The necessity to create a gulf, distance, order of rank, is
given. . . As soon as it is established, this homogenizing
species requires a justification: it lies in serving a
higher sovereign species that stands upon the former and
can raise itself to its task only by doing this. Not merely
a master race whose sole task is to rule, but a race with
its own sphere o f life, with an excess of strength for
beauty, bravery, culture, manners to the highest peak of
the spirit; an affirming race that may grant itself every
great luxury . . . beyond good and evil (W P 478).
Unquestionably, Nietzsche's hope for a race of Ubermenschen was
not rooted in a vision of a collective selection of the best humanity
had to offer, but restricted itself to a vision of the future European
man.,
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The Nazis, of course, wanted to limit this homogenization to
the Germanic type. For them, the Slavs were nothing but slaves. As
a fanatical racial purist, Himmler, for example, wished specifically
to avoid the amalgamation of all Europe's races. That very concept
mandated the incorporation of Jews, Slavs, and Mediterranean types
into the greater Germanic fold. All of the racial ideology o f the
Third Reich was designed specifically to avoid this. Himmler was
too doctrinaire in his pursuit of the ideal. Nordic prototype even to
fill his own quotas for the SS before the w ar began.
I insist on a height of 1.70 meters. I personally select a
hundred or two a year and insist on photographs which
reveal if there are any Slav or M ongolian
characteristics. I particularly want to avoid such types
as the members of the 'Soldier' Councils' of 1918-1919,
people who looked somewhat comic in our German eyes
and often gave the impression of being foreigners.15
The Nazi Marriage Order of 1931 completed the Nazi eugenic
agenda.16 All prospective brides of SS officers were required to
pass the same test of Aryan ancestral purity as were their husbands.
As the war approached, Himmler relaxed all of his ideological
convictions (excepting his intensified hatred of the Jews). In spite of
the Holocaust, the Nazi eugenic ideals for a pure Germanic
population were given increasingly less priority as the war escalated.
The practical necessities of war triumphed over the ethereal realm of
ideas. Nietzsche concerned himself far less with real human
behavior than with his own visions for the future of human
existence. The ideal o f homogenizing Europe's population epitomizes
Nietzsche's often grandiose meditations. In contrast, the Nazis still
adhered to the late nineteenth-century conventional wisdom of
cultural healing through national purification.
In fact, the Nazi view that the W est could be saved only by the
toil of Germanic blood bears an imitative resemblance to the eugenic

15Ibid., 79.
16Herbert F. Ziegler, Nazi Germany's New Aristocracy. 58.
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theories o f late nineteenth century Europe. Houston Stewart
Chamberlain, for example, advised "abandoning these formulae
which have but served to give rise to endless errors, we are left with
the simple and clear view that our whole civilization and culture of
today is the work of one definite race of men—the Teutonic."17 Such
hyperbole highlights the very source of Nietzsche's castigation o f
nationalism. Ideas of innate racial superiority paralyze the
individual into believing that all o f their actions or inactions are
justified merely by the blood flowing through their veins.
These alternative conceptions of the future composite
Europeans mark an important distinction between the thought of
Nietzsche and that of the Nazis. The distinction is an obvious one.
This part of the essay directs itself at the hidden connections between
the ideologies o f Nietzsche and the Nazis in spite o f their obvious
differences. The idea that race has a role to play, any role, is an
avenue of thought down which very few in the modem world have
been willing to travel very far. For all concerned, a regenerated
Europe was in order, complete with a new aristocracy, a pitiless
warrior class, the destruction of Christian and French Revolutionary
values, and a redefinition of community. For all these, the breeding
of a new European was literally required. One could easily focus on
their differing conceptions of the "New European." The similarities
in Nietzsche's and the Nazis' conceptions of Europe's "new man" are
subtle, and could easily be overlooked. These similarities are also
manifold, and are appreciated by few other philosophical or political
thinkers.
In 1915, when many held Nietzsche's ideas to be a key catalyst
for the war, Herbert Leslie Stewart said in Nietzsche and the Ideals
o f Modern Germany, "His view of heredity is of the very essence of
his thought."18 The advent of National Socialism did not hasten this
reading of Nietzsche. Nietzsche had earned a racist reputation long
before Hitler became known. The element of pre-Socratic Greece
most admired by Nietzsche, of course, was its aristocracy. He firmly
17Joachim Remak, The Nazi Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), 1.
18Herbert Leslie Stewart. Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modem Germany
(London: Edward Arnold, 1915), 120.
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believed that the aristocratic conception of heredity, sexuality, and
beauty facilitated the ancient Greek production and reproduction of a
higher type. Nietzsche believed in the timeless realities of the human
condition, not in "progress." The instinctual drives represent the
cardinal realities of the human condition. People's adherence to
instinct cannot help but yield them more fulfilling cultures.
•No substitute for this maxim should dictate the human
condition. Thus, progress as an idea only hinders adherence to
instinctual life by positing the misguided notion that human nature
changes and improves over time. "Mankind does not represent a
development toward something better or stronger or higher in the
sense accepted today. 'Progress' is merely a modern idea, that is, a
false idea" (ATC 571). This idea can only end in humanity's
forgetting what it means to be human, that is: forgetting what it
once meant to be human. We must therefore take our cues from the
most vibrant cultures that have ever existed. Man does not "evolve"
out of a condition of hierarchy, militarism, chauvinism, slaveownership, and myth if such a condition maintained the greatest
cultures the world has ever known. Changing such a condition only
means aiming toward decadence. A t such points in Nietzsche's
writings, he evidently epitomizes the true antithesis o f Marx. "The
labor question. The stupidity—at bottom, the degeneration of
instinct, which is today the cause of all stupidities—is that there is a
labor question at all. Certain things one does not question: that is
the first imperative of instinct" (TWI 545). Few would agree with
Nietzsche's certainty that progress does not exist. Aside from the
self-proclaimed extreme right and Nietzsche, hardly anyone in the
past two centuries has argued against progress.
Hegel perfected the Christian-universal philosophy by showing
that the dialectical procession inevitably leads to a union of man and
God. Using the Hegelian dialectic in a secular form, Marx portrayed
history as the unstoppable, progressive march of the worker toward
a universal utopia. Liberalism has taken great stock in the
technological innovations that we all witness, and in the spirit of
optimism of the Enlightenment. Even modem conservatives have
brandished the idea of progress as a weapon in their ideological
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combat. They only espouse a more controlled, guided, organic form
of progress than do liberals. Social Democrats and other moderate
leftists have pointed to the proliferation of rights for all as evidence
that we all have more, and are closer to being equal than ever, and
that all is therefore getting better. Almost any politically-minded
person of the past two centuries has placed his or her faith in human
reason and in our collective ability to identify and solve historic
"problems." As we move further from myth, superstition, and
ignorance, we "progress."
Excepting Nietzsche and the radical right, few intellectual
camps have failed to coin a new brand of progress during the last
century. For Nietzsche, the pathos of progress stands as but another
signpost of W estern decadence. It underscores another instance
where modern Western man has gotten things exactly wrong. "Faith
in 'progress'—in the lower spheres of intelligence appears as
ascending life; but this is self-deception; in the higher spheres of
intelligence as descending life" (W P 70). Few stop to consider that
the whole idea of progress necessitates a destination. One would not
get on a highway and claim to be progressing unless he or she knew
their destination and was headed toward it. For Nietzsche, in this
sense, the source o f the dilemma in the West is that mankind has no
goal. Progress in the West has taken one of two forms. Often,
dogmatic adherence to progress as an idea necessitates absolutely no
thought about its meaning. Far more often, a vague notion o f a posthierarchical culture, in which no one has more than anyone else,
either in a Christian, Marxist, or liberal sense, is blindly followed.
Nietzsche not only finds such visions patently repulsive, he offers an
alternative vision in which progress would at least mean the reverse
of regression.
It is clear, what I combat is economic optimism: as if
increasing expenditure o f everybody must necessarily
involve the increasing welfare of everybody. The
opposite seems to me to be the case: expenditure on
everybody amounts to a collective loss: man is
diminished—so one no longer knows what aim this
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tremendous process has served. An aim? a new aim?—
that is what humanity needs (WP 464).
For Nietzsche, those facilitating the progressive ideas of the present
spur man either to an undesirable end, or to no end at all. As
Nietzsche scorns the values of modern man, he posits a goal
antithetical to universal equality. Throughout his writings, he lends
support to a slave-owning warrior-aristocracy which seeks not to
avoid the exploitation of others, but to make such exploitation the
foundation of a new culture. The "new aim" of the new man
needs the opposition of the masses, o f the "leveled," a
feeling of distance from them! he stands on them, he
lives off them. This higher form of aristocracy is that
of the future.— Morally speaking, this overall
machinery, this solidarity of all gears, represents a
maximum in the exploitation o f man; but it presupposes
those on whose account this exploitation has meaning
(W P 464).
Why Nietzsche rejects the idea of progress should be clear.
Yet it total opposition to modem standards, Nietzsche unabashedly
asserted that a culture o f slavery, no matter how decadent, must be
superior to liberal-democratic capitalism. Like the Nazis, he made
huge allowances for any kind of assault upon modem egalitarianism.
"Abolition of slavery'—supposedly a tribute to 'human dignity,' is in
fact a destruction of a fundamentally higher type" (W P 174).
Nietzsche's concern with the quality of human existence falls short of
a concern for the quality of all humans' existences. Nietzsche
accepted that the pitiless exploitation o f some human minions for
menial labor allows others freedom to live more noble lives. Saying
that all can live nobly is tantamount to saying that all should live as
slaves. For the fullest existences and the higher types to thrive,
societal stratification is indispensable. "One should defend virtue
against the preachers of virtue: they are its worst enemies. For they
teach virtue as an ideal for everyone; they take from virtue the
charm of rareness, inimitableness, exceceptionalness, and
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unaverageness—its aristocratic magic" (W P 175). Nietzsche felt that
any cultural development evolving in this direction could not be
interpreted as positive. All non-exclusive cultural milieus produce a
fictitious image of freedom. "The whole o f the West no longer
possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a
future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its 'modem spirit' so
much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very
irresponsibly: precisely because this is called freedom" (ATC 543).
The most vital reason for Nietzsche's crusade against
democracy was that he truly felt democracy to be a destructive, not a
creative force. Not only does democracy make war against
everything rare and noble, it also poisons the soil on which noble
characters can grown. "Today when the herd animal alone obtains
and bestows honors in Europe, when 'equality of rights' could all too
easily change into equality in wrongdoing: I mean into a general
war on everything rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the
higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, creative
fullness of power and mastery . . . To ask it again: is greatness
possible today?" (BGE 144) Therein, Nietzsche reveals the
temptation to act against modernity. For all his predictions that
millennia would be required before an emergence from the W estern
malaise might occur, Nietzsche presents the possibility that if
something is not done soon, all hope for a rebirth of culture might
disappear forever.
The Nazi experiment does not provide the perfect realization
of Nietzsche's demand for a new aristocracy. After all, the Nazis
promised at some future date to extinguish the remains o f Germany's
ancient noble privilege. The contradiction between Nietzschean
aristocracy and the socialism of the Nazis has been shown. But
again, in every perceived difference between the two, fundamental
likenesses appear in more subtle forms. The exclusivist component
of National Socialism certainly merits a comparison with Nietzsche's
advocacy of hierarchy.
In spite o f Hitler's socialism, his conception o f hierarchy
compares with Nietzsche's ideal of cultures composed o f poleis. On
a world scale instead o f on a small scale like Greece, aristocratically
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inclined nations (particularly the Germanic) would govern their own
areas, and those immediately surrounding them. In the midst of the
world's noble nations would be excluded classes of slaves who were
forbidden to breed with, or make war like the dominant ethnic group
around them. In this sense, though, Hitler's Weltanschauung did not
necessarily limit him to the Germanic type. He accepted a similar
form of dominance for the Japanese throughout Asia. Still, Hitler
drew his inspiration from the white conquest of the western United
States, and from the colonial projects of the British around the
world. He viewed the British as a sort of Athens to outpost other
parts of the world, across the horizon from his Sparta. "I am
prepared to approach England once more with a large and
comprehensive offer . . . I am a man of great decisions and in this
case also I shall be capable of a great action. I accept the British
Empire and I am ready to pledge myself personally to its continued
existence and to commit the power of the German Reich to this.''19
However Nietzsche's and Hitler's criteria may have differed
for discerning precisely who should dominate, their principle of
domination based at least partly on ethnic grounds remains a
common theme. Hitler saw little to choose between the British
domination of Africans in reality and the German domination of the
Slavs in theory. The British had always justified their presence in
Africa on the grounds that the "inferior" races could not govern
themselves, and the British had colonized in such a way that the
Africans had become virtual slave laborers on their own continent.
The Nazi plans for the Slavs differed little. The British may not
have recognized their own hypocrisy when reading Mein Kampf,
they were largely horrified at Hitler's plans for Lebensraum. But
ideologically, Hitler counted on the British as his allies. They had
proven to him, through their own colonial policies, that they
maintained the Germanic instinct for pitiless, aristocratic dominance.
In fact, Britain's elitist colonial policies were not abandoned until
after World W ar II. Hitler saw no reason why the British should
deny him the status of ally. "For such a policy, there is only one
19Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 617.
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single ally in Europe: England. With England alone, one's back
being covered, could one begin the new Germanic invasion. Our
right to do this would not have been less than that of our forefathers.
None o f our pacifists refuses to eat the bread of the East, although
the first plow was once called 'sword'!"20
In addition to the prospects for an aristocratic order along the
lines of Athens and Sparta, the Nazi plan for settlement in the east
depended on pseudo-feudal social strata based on ethnicity. The Nazi
plan for enslaving the conquered Slavs, and repopulating their land
with Germans is well-known, and shall be covered only briefly here.
One interesting anecdote to denote the tenor of the Nazi ideology,
however, is Himmler's plan to reinvent the SS along lines strikingly
similar to the ancient O rder of the Teutonic Knights. "Himmler
never restricted him self to Russia, but (hoped to) cultivate every
possible colonial area. Furthermore, the pet scheme o f a new
Ordensland for the SS, what east Prussia had been for the Teutonic
Knights, impelled Himmler to seek settlement territory not
contiguous to Germany. Here he could develop his SS strongpoints
and his W ehrbauem (peasant m ilitia)."21
Following a Nazi victory, social stratification in Germany
proper would increasingly decline due to the Nazi socialist program.
1 Yet in the east, a system of feudal aristocracy would appear even
more inegalitarian than anything from the Middle Ages. Himmler's
SS would form the core of a Germanic ethnic community in a
remote island of the former Slavic hinterlands. They would provide
the leadership of a bureaucratic-warrior class, like a class of
Janissaries, and would be the nucleus of a breeding stock to usher in .
the age of the Ubermenschen. The SS would be supported by a
second sphere of Germanic ethnicity in the form of form er soldiers,
promised land after the conquest of Lebensraum. They would form
the rank-and-file o f a peasant militia to guard the conquered lands
against the surrounding Slavs.22 In the lowest caste, the Slavs would

20Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf.183.
2 R obert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 254.
22Ibid.
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remain in the countryside for w hatever menial purpose their
Germanic masters set for them.
This picture begs an interesting question. When comparing
the ideas of Nietzsche and the Nazis concerning the issue of
aristocratic versus mass culture, should one focus on socialism in
Germany, or the hope for feudal serfdom in the newly conquered
eastern territories?
If one pictures Himmler's Lebensraum as the model of
Germanic sociological ideology, comparisons with Nietzsche
substantially suffer. The enslavement o f the Slavs along strict ethnic
lines, the insistence that the Germans play the role of the Master
Race, and the attempt even to forge the M aster Race from the shoddy
ideological materials o f the modem age would all have either given
Nietzsche pause, or made him laugh out loud. Still, Nietzsche could
not have objected to the seeming injustice of such a situation. The
Nazi colonization of the east was a wildly anachronistic idea, and
completely lacking in justification during an increasingly egalitarian
age. The Nazi conception of Lebensraum fits the modern definition
of evil. And as Nietzsche would say, "From a superior v iew p o in t. .
. one desires the ever-increasing dominion o f evil, the growing
emancipation of man from the narrow and fear-ridden bonds of
morality, the increase of force, in order to press the mightiest
natural pow er—the affects—into service" (W P 208). And, "the evil
god is needed no less than the good god: after all, we do not owe
our own existence to tolerance and humanitarianism" (ATC 583).
For Nietzsche, even the most crass experiments are at least as
justified as the perseverance of universalism in all its forms.
The Correlation of the Christian and Marxist Utopias
Correlations are often made between Marxist-Leninism and
Nazi-Fascism. Both espouse totalitarian forms of government to
control the population. Both rely on mass-movements to attain and
secure power. The extreme left and the extreme right have
traditionally put a higher value on order and adherence to
ideological convictions than on creativity. Both have taken part in
the greatest genocides in history. These issues reflect similar tactics
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for the maintenance of control. Yet neither the Marxists nor the
Nazis believe in totalitarianism as a goal, a hope, and a dream. Total
authority represents only the means to an end. The ends sought by
each could not be much different than they are.
In the words of Steven Aschheim, "Nietzsche was harnessed to
the struggle against Marxism and bolshevism, which Nietzsche
regarded as his greatest future opponent, the very embodiment of
nihilism."23 It is often forgotten that Communists have traditionally
viewed their ideology as the ultimate consummation of democratic
values. Communist East Germany, for example, was called the
German Democratic Republic. Ideally in Communism (though never
in practice), everyone in society is equal, and therefore has an equal
voice in government. Nietzsche shared the view that Communism
logically succeeded democracy. He disagreed with Hegel's dialectic
and believed that history had no destination. Marx represented to
Nietzsche an intensified absurdity of dialectical theory, having
simply added the poisons of materialism and nihilism. Says Nolte,
"What Nietzsche hated most in Marxism was not its proletarian but
its bourgeois nature."24 Nietzsche followed dialectical theory to the
extent that he recognized the transition from Christianity to the
Enlightenment, and from democracy to communism as a logical
progression. And while he seldom if ever mentions Marx directly,
his systemic crusade against "socialist blockheads" leaves little doubt
about his main target. Nietzsche saw no necessary end result to
history, and he viewed all of the above value systems as stemming
from originally misguided principles. Nietzsche recognized a causal,
historical chain in history in the Marxist-Hegelian sense. He simply
refused to view this chain as evidence of any pre-ordained outcome.
In opposition to the universal, dialectical, progressive visions
of the leftist Marx and the Christian Hegel, Nietzsche's Genealogy o f
Morals "shows us a noble past, a triumphant slave revolt in morality,
and a confused, directionless present."25 With Hegel and Marx (as
23Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 238.
24Emst Nolte. Three Faces of Fascism. 314.
25Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker.
154.
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examples), if history has a goal, then the dialectical points of
synthesis along the path toward that goal are good and necessary. As
soon as the goal is taken from the equation, as Nietzsche does, then
the stopping points on the dialectic, like the transition from
feudalism to capitalism to utopia, or from Christianity to
Enlightenment to democracy to utopia, also lose their meaning. In
this way, Nietzsche adds fire to his assault on many of the Western
values forged from Socrates to Christ and beyond.
From these ideological grounds, Nietzsche launches his assault
on Christianity, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and
socialism or communism. Said Nietzsche, "I abhor Christianity with
a deadly hatred, because it created sublime words and gestures to
throw over a horrible reality the cloak o f justice, virtue, and
divinity" (W P 364). In other words, Christianity represents a grand
systematization of ideological uncleanliness and pretense. It might be
called the first brand of political correctness, "the most fatal,
seductive lie that has yet existed" (W P 117). Nietzsche pinpoints the
early equation between the decadence of Socratic logo-centrism, and
Christianity. Both represent an assault on life. "Christianity only
takes up the fight that had already begun against the classical ideal
and the noble religion" (WP 115). Into the vacuum of ancient Greek
culture swept Christianity, masquerading as life where life once had
reigned. "What astonishes one about the religiosity of the ancient
Greeks is the tremendous amount o f gratitude that emanates from it the kind of man who stands thus before nature and before life is a
very noble one! - Later, when the rabble came to predominate in
Greece, fear also overran religion; and Christianity was preparing
itself" (BGE 78). Marxism represents the latest and most insidious
strain of the corrosive virus against the instinctive, hierarchical,
pitiless impulses that had once defined ancient Greek culture.
For Nietzsche, nobility survived during the Middle Ages in
spite o f Christianity. Feudalism carried on the spirit o f preChristian barbarism and lust for life more than it represented any
component of Christian ideology. "The Christian faith is from the
beginning sacrifice: sacrifice o f all freedom, all pride, all selfconfidence o f the spirit, at the same time enslavement and self
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mockery, self-mutilation" (BGE 75). It represents spirituality as a
revolt against the natural instinct to outdo one's neighbor. The tenor
of Christianity seeks not to elevate the ferocious, competitive,
hungry spirit of all, and to raise the standard of the greatest human
existence. Rather, it brings everyone down to the same level of the
lowest and least instinctive natures. "Christianity is a rebellion of
everything that crawls on the ground against that which has height:
the evangel of the 'lowly' makes low" (ATC 620). The renunciation
of earthly existence leads to the culled existence of the Christian.
All Christian societies do not, per se, openly wage war against
those who adhere to their instincts. The Middle Ages exemplify a
time when the pre-Christian elements o f culture played as evident a
role in the culture as did Catholicism. But since with Nietzsche, all
things are perpetually in ascendancy or decline, it follows that
Christian ethics can only grow at the expense of the beliefs o f the
cultures into which they have crept. Christian impulses do not wish
simply to co-exist with the norms of their host cultures.
"Christianity should not be beautified and embellished: it has waged
deadly war against this higher type of man; it has placed all the basic
instincts of this type under the ban; and out o f these instincts it has
distilled evil and the Evil One: the strong man as the typically
reprehensible man, the 'reprobate" (ATC 571). Paradoxically,
Christianity extols peaceful ethics, but fights with a deadly venom
against all cultural traits, or traits of higher men, which do not lend
support to universal brotherhood. Only ideas which lend support to
the herd mentality will survive the Christian wrath. "The Christian
type: or the perfect bigot" (WP 188). In such ways, it slowly but
surely filled the vacuum of ancient Greek culture, and it also
destroyed the Romans.
Christianity was the vampire of the imperium Romanum
. . . This stealthy vermin which sneaked up to every
single one in the night, in fog and ambiguity, and sucked
out o f each single one the seriousness for true things . . .
this cowardly, effeminate, and saccharine pack of
alienated 's o u ls '. . . slowly fanned the fires of chandala
revenge . . . the same kind of religion which, in its pre-

79

existent form, Epicurus already had waged war against:
not paganism but 'Christianity,' by which I mean the
corruption of souls by the concepts of guilt, punishment,
and immortality (ATC 649).
The Nazi attack on Christianity mirrored this. While
Christianity presented a potential rival to the societal primacy of the
Nazis and had to be fought in the interests of perpetuating a
totalitarian regime, the Nazis also maintained very substantial
ideological convictions against Christianity. In the words of World
W ar II scholar Robert Herzstein, "Hitler hated Christianity, viewing
it as a reactionary, anti-racial force of Jewish origin."26 Hitler's
concerns about Christianity did not mirror Nietzsche's same
reservations about it. Yet the attack on the "higher man" motivated
much of the Nazi attack on Christian ideology.
As shown in the official dossier of Reich Security Officer
Reinhard Heydrich, the Gestapo wished to eradicate Christianity
from G erm any.27 Most of the Nazi invectives against Christianity
are shrouded in racist rhetoric, such as in the 1920 Nazi Party
Program which opposed the "Jewish materialist spirit."28 Yet
attention should be given not ju st to the Nazis' opposition to things
"Jewish," but also to their opposition to a perceived "materialist
spirit." As pointed out by Bullock, "it is often forgotten that Point
19 of the original Nazi program of 1920 demanded that 'Roman
Law, which serves a materialistic world order, be replaced By a
German Common Law ."29 Like Nietzsche, the Nazis viewed
Christianity as an antithetical ideological competitor, but also as the
very embodiment of the decay of an organic spiritual order.
The Nazis' program generally focused on the future, and
rejected things which they deemed "reactionary," including
Christianity. Yet paradoxically, they too are often also labeled as
reactionaries. A prime reason for this label is the antiquarian nature
26Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 1.
27Ibid., 4.
28Ibid., 37.
29Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 215.

80

of their spiritual alternatives to Christianity. The Nazis had no
futuristic solution to the problem of post-Christian Germanic
spirituality. Their best solution was to re-authenticate pre-Christian
Germanic paganism. And "the SS more than any other formation in
the Third Reich tried to replace traditional Christianity with a neo
paganism, which was but an improvised adjunct to the National
Socialist ideology in the 'spiritual sphere."30 The idea was not that
the Christian God provided too potent a competitor in the new
Germany. Nor was the underlying desire of the Nazis an officially
atheistic state. In fact, Himmler said that "any human being who
does not believe in God should be considered arrogant,
megalomaniacal, and stupid."31
Like Nietzsche, the Nazis saw the advent of Christianity as the
source of the inversion of values. The instinctual, mythical, and
noble culture of the pagan Germans resulted from thousands of years
of accumulated cultural knowledge whose ultimate source resided in
their very blood. Unlike Nietzsche, the Nazis' obsession with blood
shadowed over all of their ideology. Yet Nietzsche accepted the
biological source of culture in principle, and took for granted the
existence of a "Germanic soul" and its evident manifestations in preChristian culture.
The development of the Jewish priestly state is not
original; they learned the pattern in Babylon: the
pattern is Aryan. When later on, the same thing became
. dominant in a Europe with a preponderance of
Germanic blood, this was in accordance with the spirit
of the ruling race: a great atavism. The Germanic
Middle Ages aimed at a revival of the Aryan order of
Castes (W P 92).
Unfortunately, for Nietzsche, the Christian spirit of the Middle Ages
prevailed over the Germanic instinct for hierarchy. The Nazis
wished to correct this error, although a concrete plan for a mystical
reversion to the "Germanic spirit" never materialized. Either way,
30Herbert F. Ziegler, Nazi Germany's New Aristocracy. 92.
31 Ibid., 85.
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the invectives o f both Nietzsche and the Nazis share a vital similarity.
For all concerned, Christianity must be replaced as a it detracts from
the maintenance, let alone the production, o f higher types. As long
as "evil" exists as a category of behavior, the more selfish, dominant,
naturally-inclined master type must feel guilt for the position of
superiority which he imposes on others. This guilt presents the
consummate poison in any post-decadent Nietzschean society, and in
the proposed New Order of the Nazis.
In opposition to the "medieval dogmas" o f Christianity that
continued to plague the Germanic spirit, Alfred Rosenberg in
particular sought to demarcate which components of Christianity
could be accepted in the Reich, and which were corrosive beyond
redemption. Both the Lutheran and Catholic churches maintained
too much ideological sway in Germany to permit a full-scale
ideological assault by the Nazis. Such a move would likely have
produced more political heat than the Nazis could have handled.
Instead, Rosenberg distinguished between "positive" and "negative"
Christianity as a way of assuaging the "most damaging" effects of the
Christian spirit, while at the same time capitulating to the reality that
Christianity could not at any time soon be eradicated from Germany.
"Positive" Christianity emanated from "the mystic doctrine of
blood" and the distinguishing features o f Germanic culture.32 The
positive elements in Christianity might be characterized as those
elements which the original Germanic converts likely found
appealing and in accordance with their own cultures, such as the
obedience of the son to the command of the father. "Negative"
Christianity, as one might expect, interfered with the hierarchical
organization of nations along natural lines.33 Through Christian
universalism, racial considerations had been undermined in Europe,
and such elements were actively propagandized against by the Nazis.
Christian universalism had become especially dangerous in
conjunction with the acceptance o f Enlightenment ideals. Basically,
the elements of Christianity found least desirable by the Nazis were

32Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 45.
33Ibid.
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those which interfered with the supposed natural instincts of the
Germans.
The Enlightenment. The French Revolution, and Democracy
Nietzsche believed that just like Christianity, "Democracy
represents the disbelief in great human beings and an elite society:
'Everyone is equal to everyone else.' At bottom we are one and all
self-seeking cattle and mob" (WP 397). The connection is no
accident. Any society which renounces hierarchy does so under the
banner of the Christian-slave victory. Enlightenment intellectuals
peddled their intellectual wares as alternatives to superstition,
dogma, and ignorance. In short, they challenged the perceived
legacy of medieval Christianity. The philosophes were supposed to
be the alternative to Christianity. But, ironically, "enlightened"
democracy came closer to fulfilling the Christian promise of equality
than the Catholic church ever had. "Democratization is a more
natural form o f (Christianity), one less mendacious" (W P 126). In
addition to finding equality in heaven and before God, an idea
characterized by Nietzsche as "the non plus ultra of nonsense on
earth!," (WP 468) now all were "created equal" on earth as well.
For Nietzsche, the herd has simply become more insidious; it hides
its agenda with different names and "isms," but the compulsion to
destroy caste and those worthy of great and evil deeds remains
consistent. "To me, justice speaks thus: 'Men are not equal.' Nor
shall they become equal! What would my love of the Overman be if
I spoke otherwise" (ZAR 213).
No wonder, then, that Nietzsche holds Christianity responsible
for the French Revolution. Many scholars have interpreted the
French Revolution as a revolt against the remnants of medieval
Catholic feudalism and historic dogmatic religiosity. But the
Revolution represents for Nietzsche only the official Western break
with God. Paradoxically, as God is no longer the guarantor o f right
and wrong, secular Western man clings ever more tightly to the
demand that he has rights.
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A nother Christian concept, no less crazy, has passed
evermore deeply into the tissue of modernity: the
concept of 'the equality of souls before God." This
concept furnishes the proto-type o f all theories of equal
rights . . . no w onder that man ended by taking it
seriously, taking it practically!—that is to say,
politically, democratically, socialistically, in the spirit of
pessimism of indignation (WP 401).
In many ways, the French Revolutionaries represented to Nietzsche
the consummate original Christians. They fought with a passion
describable only as the "herd passion." It was their "will to equality
that was their will to power." (WP 80) It is the only power that
slaves know. The Revolutionaries slaughtered the aristocracy
because the former desired what the latter had, not because they
believed injustice. Most of all, theirs was a passion of ressentiment,
and they wanted others to suffer as they had suffered. Theirs was an
ethic of revenge. The Revolutionaries were the result o f centuries of
victories for the slave revolt in morals. "This instinct of revenge has
mastered mankind in the course o f millennia . . . as far as man has
thought, he has introduced the bacillus of revenge into things" (WP
401).
Interestingly, critiques of the French Revolution normally
begin with some reminder o f its licentious brutality, bordering on
genocide. Nietzsche has no problem with the violence, only with the
importance of another landmark victory for the herd, and the decline
of another distinguished racial type in the form of the French
aristocracy.
The social hodgepodge, consequence of the Revolution,
the establishment o f equal rights . . . the bearers of the
instincts of decline including the slave instincts, the
instincts of cowardice, cunning, and canaille in those
orders that have long been kept down, mingle with the
blood of all classes: two, three generations later the
race is no longer recognizable—everything has become
mob. From this there results a collective instinct against
selection, against privilege of all kinds, that is so
powerful and self-assured, hard, and cruel in its
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operation, that the privileged themselves soon succumb
to it: whoever still wants to retain power flatters the
mob, works with the mob, must have the mob on its side
(WP 461).
Clearly with Nietzsche, the Revolution stands as but another signpost
of Western cultural exhaustion.
The Nazi ideology deals more clearly with the historical
development of egalitarianism than with perhaps any other historical
development. Predictably, the Nazis were obsessed with the way in
which the forces of world equality worked against racial hierarchy.
Nietzsche shared this concern, but devoted only a small portion of
his thought to the issue. But both Nietzsche and the Nazis took the
unusual position that all viable Western ideologies from Christianity
to liberalism to M arxism were but variations o f a single, insipid
ideological impulse. Not many thinkers o f the last 200 years would
gladly discard all of these systems as irredeemably disfigured
ideological baggage. Such an extreme position begs for extreme
cultural solutions. If all forms of egalitarianism, pacifism,
humanitarianism, and their ideological kin are renounced, little of
the rock upon which Western Culture has been constructed remains
to be recognized.
Many would portray the Nazi experiment as the very
embodiment of Revolutionary animus and terror in the twentieth
century. The idea o f the genocide of an ostensibly privileged group
draws a comparison between the Nazis and the Jacobins, and between
Hitler and Robespierre. In the words of Ronald Smelser, the Nazis
embody "the double edged sword posed by Rousseau's 'General
Will.' The Nazi regime represented, as an experiment in totalitarian
democracy, the other edge of that sword. It was a very 'modem '
form o f tyranny."34
Ideologically, though, the Nazis could not have been more
opposed to the purported values of the French Revolution. For the
Nazis, the Revolution generated the dangerous fictions which have
34Ronald Smelser, "How 'Modem' were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the
Modernization Question,’’ 299.
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augmented the corrosive effects of Christianity throughout
modernity. For instance, Nietzsche and the Nazis would have agreed
with Gobineau's naturalist summation that "there are no human
rights, any more than there are . . . rights o f the armadillo. The idea
of justice is itself an illusion. Nothing exists but violence."35 This
echoes the world-view of the first right-wing ideologists such as
Lagarde, Van Den Bruck, and Julius Langbehn who were Nietzsche's
contemporaries. For all of these, nature as a law trumps a
perceived, pretentious proliferation o f rights in an increasingly
effeminate culture.
Germany's militaristic, aristocratic establishment had opposed
the leftist values of the Revolution at least since Germany unified.
Bismarck's militarism represents an early concurrence with the Nazi
cultural opposition to liberal-democratic values. In the words of
Alan Bullock, even von Hindenberg, in spite of his personal distaste
for Hitler, "agreed with much of what Hitler said: his attacks on the
'system,' his denunciation of democratic politics and the M arxist
parties, his call for national unity, the abolition of the peace
settlement, and the restoration of German greatness, including
military pow er."36 The German right had espoused these values for
nearly a century, in large part as an antithesis of the values of the
Revolution. But after fifty years of a leftward political drift in
Germany, Hitler had to reinvent many of the same convictions that
had been taken for granted during Bismarck's' age. "There is only
one most sacred human right, and this right is at the same time the
most sacred obligation, namely: to see to it that the blood is
preserved pure, so that by the preservation of the best human
material a possibility is given for a more noble development of these
human beings."37
Why did the Nazis oppose the ideologies of the French
Revolution? O f course, Nazi militarism, advocacy of hierarchy, and
chauvinism automatically opposed the raison d'etre of the

35Ernst Nolte, th ree Faces of Fascism. 280.
36Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 235.
3 7Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf.606.
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Enlightenment. Also, nationalism had, during the nineteenth
century, ceased to be the tool of groups who wished to sabotage the
remnants o f aristocratic-European privilege. National pride had
become an exclusive, right-wing impulse that stood in the way of
Marxist internationalism and proletarian world-unity.
Yet a less obvious rift between the values o f the right and
those of the French Revolution is exemplified in an observance
shared by Nietzsche and the Nazis. Nietzsche noted that the French
Revolution had promoted an environment encouraging the weakness
of all, as an alternative to a world where some are stronger than
others. "It substituted slow suicide [for greatness]: gradually a
petty, poor, but durable life; gradually a quite ordinary, bourgeois,
mediocre life, etc." (W P 145). The Nazis recognized this, and
demanded performance of the highest level, in a competitive
atmosphere, in every segment of society. "The so-called
Reichsberufsweltkampf (Reich skills competition) was inaugurated
with great fanfare in 1936; by 1939 3.5 million apprentices were
competing in local, regional, and national, ’Olympics' which allowed
the Nazis to set ever higher standards o f performance, while at the
same time inculcating the concept of Volksgemeinschaft."38 Hitler
wished to perpetrate many terrible deeds, but he also wished to halt
the march of decadence as he defined it, and as Nietzsche similarly
defined it. This required a complete reorientation of Germans away
from the Enlightenment values that they had become accustomed to.
The word 'propaganda' is inadequate to convey the
revolutionary character of Hitler's objective: nothing
less than the transformation of people's consciousness,
corresponding to his constantly repeated belief that it
was politics, faith, and will, not economics and material
circumstances, that were the deciding forces in history,
corresponding also to his own unique ability to move the
masses.39

38Ronald Smelser, "How ’Modem’ were the Nazis?," 288.
39Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 318.
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The re-education of Germany was actively conducted along
perceived Nietzschean lines. According to Aschheim, "Nietzschean
illiberalism, anti-humanism, and a politicized Lebensphilosophie
were placed at the center of the new educational philosophy."40 In
addition to Nazi race theory, students were subject to a curriculum
emphasizing history, German language and literature, and a marked
increase in time devoted to sports and physical education 41 The
Nazis provided countless venues for an individual man to
demonstrate his superior skills, relative to others, in all walks o f life.
The 1936 Olympics in Berlin exemplify this, but provide only one
example. The Eilenriede Motorcycle Races promoted the beauty of
technology while providing new outlets for individual bravery and
exceptionality.42 While the Nazis claimed that they would do much
for the German people, they insisted that the individual must liberate
himself from the m odem world, and its softening of the heart and
soul. The individual German must, in some capacity, show that he is
an Ubermensch. Said Goebbels, "The German worker will be free
(not when the Nazi system frees him), . . . but only if he frees
himself, with his own strength, and he will do that when he can no
longer bear the chains of slavery."43 Naturally, this is not a
reference to Marx's interest capital slavery, but to Nietzsche's
metaphysical and existential slavery.
The W arrior Philosophy
My "future":—a rigorous polytechnic education.
Military service; so that, on average, every man of the
higher classes would be an officer, whatever else he
might be (W P 418).
Keith Ansell-Pearson, a prominent Nietzsche scholar, has
written two books: Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, and An Introduction
40Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 241.
41Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 320.
42Adelheid von Saldem, "Cultural Conflicts, Popular Mass Culture, and the
Question of Nazi Success," 323.
43Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 149.
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to Nietzsche as Political Thinker, in an attem pt to pinpoint a political
agenda in "the last antipolitical German." Ansell-Pearson identified
that agenda as the following: "The aim of the politics of the
Overman is not to unite people, but to divide them into the strong
and the weak."44 Nietzsche gives mixed signals regarding whether
or not this can be accomplished along racial lines [and future Nazi
principles]. But what is certain, as articulated by Fukuyama, is that
"Nietzsche deliberately sought to undermine belief in human
equality, arguing that this was simply a prejudice instilled by
Christianity . . . and ended up celebrating what amounted to a
doctrine of cruelty."45 This fusion of caste and cruelty leads him to
advocate a form of primitive warrior culture, again in the spirit of
the ancient Greeks. For Nietzsche, the existences of those in a
warrior caste transcends all others, even the being of the artist. Due
to his great enthusiasm in this area, admirers of Nietzsche could not
help but be tempted by a modern militarism.
Contra Marx, "Nietzsche regards the social contract of civil
society to be a fraud: not of the strong over the weak, but of the
weak over the strong."46 Only through the discipline of a warrior
class could the masses be kept in their proper, submissive place, and
then could the caste system flourish. As stated, Nietzsche saw the
Jews, as an example, lose their warrior class and spin into a cultural
decline. W arriors maintain cultural integrity, and embody the
possibility of the ultimate existence. "War is the father of all good
things, war is also the father of good prose" (GSC 145). In an age
where peace is held up as the ultimate value, and men with
aggressive natures are rebuffed as adolescents, Nietzsche maintains
that "the mature man has, above all, weapons: he attacks" (WP 385).
Mature, that is, in adherence to his instincts. In fact, in the warrior,
all of the best instincts, even those of the artist, are combined into
one. "Art as the redemption of the man of action--of those who not
only see the terrifying and questionable character of existence but
44Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker. 74.
45Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. 333.
46Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau. 112.
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live it, want to live it, the tragic-warlike man, the hero" (W P 452).
For Nietzsche* civilizations value peace as a relief from the horrors
of war. Cultures value war as a respite from an emasculating peace.
The warrior is aggressive, roving, lusting for conquest,
domineering, and virile. In short, a warrior is a man who still has
his instincts. A warrior is masculine. This wisdom has been lost to
modernity. "Just because the 'male organ' has been amputated from
virtue, a feminine one has been brought to the voice of virtue that it
did not have before" (WP 120).
Like Hitler, Nietzsche praised the Spartans for their culture of
military genius and caste domination.47 His admiration for those
who dominated without pity or compunction extended especially to
Cesare Borgia and Napoleon. Spengler noted the tenor of
Germany's reception of Nietzsche's M achiavellian militarism.
"Nietzsche baptized with the name of Cesare Borgia - in such an
age, unless we learn to act as real history wants us to act, we will
cease to exist as a people."48 Spengler's interpretation, that Borgian
lust for conquest represents the very necessity of Germany's
survival, is not a misreading. In fact, Nietzsche's militaristic
incantations sometimes blend into an out-of-character tolerance for
nationalism.
The maintenance of the military state is the last means of
all of acquiring or maintaining the great tradition with
regard to the supreme type of man, the strong type.
And all concepts that perpetuate enmity and difference
in rank between states (e.g. nationalism, protective
tariffs) may appear sanctioned in this light (W P 386).
Nietzsche points to the relations between Frederick the Great
and his father to illustrate this point. Frederick W ilhelm I "knew
that men were lacking in Germany, and he suspected, with the
bitterest vexation, that his own son was not enough of a man." Had
he been right, he would have been justified in his brutal treatment of
47Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker. 75.
48Oswald Spengler, "Nietzsche and His Century,” as quoted in Steven Aschheim,
The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 20.
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Frederick. But it turned out Hthat he was deceived . . . and his
skepticism (once mistaken for the Enlightenment variety) was of
audacious manliness, which is related most closely to genius for war
and conquest and which first entered Germany in the person of
Frederick the Great" (BGE 139). Nietzsche believed that the
Germans as a nation benefited from the ethic of militarism
introduced by Frederick. Few others thinkers have dared to make
this argument.
Ansell-Pearson says that "Nietzsche understands politics as
being neither individualistic nor collectivistic."49 Extreme
nationalism reflects a culture's loss o f creativity but in the modem
world, a militarism with a complete lack of nationalism would be
meaningless. And without some form o f militarism, the greatest
existences cannot be complete. "One has renounced the great life
when one has renounced war" (TWI 489). It has often been said that
Nietzsche gave up his mystical W agnerian militarism after his
grotesque experiences as a field-hospital orderly in the FrancoPrussian War, and that he became a pacifist.50 This is evidently
absurd after reading any of his works. Nietzsche even discussed the
possibility of a duel with his former friend Paul Ree in 1880. He
was thirty-five. In one of his last writings, Nietzsche stated that
"since I do not by any means share the unwarlike views of my friend
Galiani, I am not afraid o f predicting a few things and thus, of
conjuring up the cause of wars" (WP 81).
Nietzsche prescribed no necessary ends for his militarism.
Here, Nietzsche's bias for instinct over reason stands plain.
Militarism as a way of life, as a good in itself, should not be
distinguished by a logocentric conception of war as a necessary evil
only in the service of progress, and the end o f all wars. W ar is only
another mode of W estern decadence when it is waged to "good"
ends. "You say it is the good cause that hallow even war? I say unto
you: it is the good war that hallows any cause. W ar and courage
have accomplished more great things than love of the neighbor. Not
49Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker.
150.
5°Ibid., 26.
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your pity but your courage has so far saved the unfortunate" (ZAR
159). Militarism flourishes in Nietzsche's writing as an alternative
to universalism in all its forms, but particularly Christianity. "All of
the deities on Olympus would have had occasion for immortal
laughter: Cesare Borgia for Pope. Am I understood? Well then,
that would have been the victory which alone I crave today: with
that, Christianity would have been abolished" (ATC 654). W ithout
question, no "post-modern," or postmodern Nietzschean world
would be complete w ithout warfare, literally.
Nietzsche's love of warfare also underscores his general
suspicion of the intelligensia. "My brothers, drive the dogs away
from him (the hero), the lazy creepers, and all the ravenous vermin-all the raving vermin o f the 'educated,' who feast on every hero's
sweat" (ZAR 320). Modernity has fostered an environment in which
war cannot be waged except as a tool for an ultimately pacifistic end.
The innately irrational nature o f war, as with all extra-rational
natural events, become questioned in hyper-logical settings,
especially academia. Nietzsche's militarism, then, exists in direct
contrast to rationalism, as well as any form of pacifism. The Nazis
adopted all of these Nietzschean struggles. The spirit of Nietzsche's
admiration for the dazzlingly-clad Greek warrior was captured in
the symbolism of "fascist" grandeur. "The M arxist critic W alter
Benjamin denounced the aestheticization of violence in fascist
glorifications of W orld W ar I, an aestheticization he would later see
as emblematic of the fascist approach to politics."51
Nietzsche's conception o f life is cyclical. "Progress" is a
fiction; nothing can grow without taxing something else. All is a
zero sum game. If something declines, its antithesis invariably fills
its vacuum. Heroism and pacifism are opposites, and cannot flourish
concomitantly. The fruits of rationalism and irrationalism cannot be
harvested in the same season. The master cannot thrive except at the
expense of slaves. In all eternal struggles, one side is always gaining
ground. Lack o f action hastens the victory of one's antipode as life
is always moving. Hitler recognized and used the eternal-diametrical
51 Edward Dimondberg, Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, The Weimar Source Book. 145.
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model to which Nietzsche contributed immensely. "Hitler was able
to attract neoconservative intellectuals who rejected the rationalism
and flabby liberalism of the modem world in favor o f a Nietzschean
irrationalism, heroic man in place of economic m an."52 The
reclamation of the warrior ethic took on a plethora of forms in the
Third Reich. Germans students, especially boys, participated in one
of the most physically demanding compulsory fitness movements in
history. Says Aschheim, "For the Nazis, the decadent and feminized
nineteenth century was to give way to a new masculine warrior-age,
one that regarded Nietzsche as a pioneer of the German rediscovery
of the body."53
Nietzsche's admiration for the Greeks and Greek attention to
physical beauty was interpreted by the Nazis, with much legitimacy,
as another calling to the creation of a higher racial type. The
Germans should harden their bodies in order to prepare them selves,
for domination, to show themselves worthy of domination, and to
recapture the discipline of physical pain that masters must endure for
victory. Said Hitler, "Not a day should pass during which the
young man is not trained physically for at least one hour in the
morning and again in the evening, in every kind of sport and
gymnastics, s p o rt. . . promotes the spirit of aggression in the same
measure, and demands determination quick as lightning, and educates
the body for steel-like versatility."54 In a speech to the officers of
three W affen SS divisions, Himmler spurred his best men to imbue
the army with the Nazi Weltanschauung. "I beg you as commanding
officers, as chiefs and leaders, to instruct your men again and again
in our ideological beliefs . . . I ask you to look after them, and guide
them, and not let them go before they are really saturated with our
spirit and are fighting like the old guard fo u g h t. . . W e have only
one task—to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle without
m ercy."55

52Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives.225.
53Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 238.
54Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 616.
55Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 246.
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In a Nietzschean sense, the Nazis recognized the ascendancy of .
the warrior ethic as the only alternative to the increasing ascendancy
of a feminized-pacifism. As if carrying a banner for the masculinewarrior instinct, the Nazis viciously attacked the leftist ideal of a
peaceable humanity. T o Hitler, the W eimar Republic suffered from
"a lack of determination and courage that tries to conceal itself under
the cloak of a humanitarian attitude."56 Similarly, Nietzsche's
assault on humanitarianism, and its ideological kin, inevitably
followed his advocacy of cultures based on courage and the pitiless
w arrior existence.

56Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 198.
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Chapter IV:

Conclusion

A practical instruction and demonstratio ad absurdium
would not strike me as undesirable even if it were
gained and paid for with a tremendous expenditure of
human lives. In any case, even as a restless mole under
the soil of a society that wallows in stupidity, socialism
will be able to be something useful and therapeutic: it
delays 'peace on earth' and the total mollification of the
democratic herd animal; it forces the Europeans to
retain spirit, namely cunning and cautious care, not to
abjure manly and warlike virtues altogether, and to
retain some remnant of spirit, o f clarity, sobriety, and
coldness of the spirit—it protects Europe for the time
being from the marasmus feminismus that threatens it
(W P 78).
It could be argued that the Nazi experiment was the
"demonstration o f absurdity” desired by Nietzsche, but at no point
did he literally call for a Holocaust. W ithout question, the idea that
Nietzsche provided the perfect philosophical avenue for the Nazi
train of thought is indefensible. Nationalism, socialism, Wagnerian
symbolism, anti-Semitism, mass culture, and the Germans themselves
were disapproved of by Nietzsche. The boorish hyperbole of any
political party could not incorporate his elegant, subtle, and eclectic
wisdom on most points. In comparison with the Nazis' artifice,
transcendent artistic creativity played a small role in their "will to
power." "Estimated merely for his value for Germany and German
culture, Richard W agner remains a great question mark, perhaps a
German misfortune, in any case a destiny" (W P 67). Also, Hitler
aimed at greater civilization, in spite o f his barbarism, while
Nietzsche had other plans.
The great moments of culture were always, morally
speaking, times of corruption; and conversely, the
periods when the taming of the human animal
("civilization") was desired and enforced were times of
intolerance against the boldest and most spiritual
natures. Civilization has aims different from those o f
culture—perhaps they are even opposite (WP 75).
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Still, whether Hitler advocated the renewal of "civilization" or
not, he regarded him self as the type of predatory human that
Nietzsche repeatedly advocated. If "the great moments of culture
were always, morally speaking, times of corruption," then how
might Nietzsche have interpreted the Nazi experiment as anything
but a high moment in the rebirth of culture? Compared with the
Nazis, no experiment ever attempted has so violently rejected the
morality of its civilization. By these particular Nietzschean criteria,
the Nazis conducted a desirable experiment.
A literal reading of Nietzsche eliminates him as the intellectual
father of National Socialism, because he rejected nationalism,
socialism, and so much else of what the Nazis stood for. Y et such a
reading demands that any ideological comparison between Nietzsche
and any political party requires an issue by issue agreement between
the two. Marx and Lenin disagreed on the required historical stages
before world revolution, the role of a ruling elite party, and the
status of farmers in communist society. Yet dismissing the obvious
connections between Marx and Lenin based on these and other
differences would seem academically dishonest. Comparisons
between Marx and Lenin generally benefit from a likening of their
similarities rather than a fixation on their differences. Scholars do
not need to be shown an issue by issue agreement between Marx and
Lenin to recognize that they reside in the same ideological
constellation. Yet in an attempt to distance all ideas of value from
National Socialism, the scholarly establishment has chosen to treat
comparisons between Nietzsche and the Nazis much more literally,
and with far less nuance than equivalent comparisons between Marx
and Lenin.
The fact remains that very few people today claim to have
anything in common with the Nazis, ideologically or otherwise. This
makes any ideological common ground between them and Nietzsche
particularly conspicuous. Since the late nineteenth century, very few
thinkers have seriously questioned the values of the French
Revolution, let alone mocked and castigated them. None besides
Nietzsche and the extreme right have posited militarism as a value in
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itself. Only Nietzsche and the right have extolled the necessity of
spiritual aristocracy, attention to breeding, and the role of race in
any healthy culture. Only they have questioned the legitimacy of
Christian (Hegelian), M arxist, and liberal notions of progress.
Hardness, heartlessness, the possibility of rebirth through
destruction, the purity of violence, the necessity of exclusion: these
are the uncommon ethical values upon which both Nietzsche's and
the Nazis' new European orders were to be built. Nietzsche and the
Nazis are distinguished much more by method than by spirit. While
they differ in the tools they would use to mold their post-decadent
worlds, they obviously hale from the same rare ideological
stratosphere.
Oddly, Nietzsche and the Nazis shared much ideologically, but
also differed much in form. This begs the question: In spite of so
many similarities in their visions for a future European culture, how
could the Nazis have so grotesquely mistreated the Jews both
ideologically and physically, while Nietzsche generally gives them
fair treatment? This results directly from the Nazis' mind-numbing
nationalist debauch, repeatedly warned against by Nietzsche. The
Nazis' maniacal obsession with (as opposed to Nietzsche's cultured
interest in) physical types prohibited them from being even the
slightest bit inclusive. The chasm that separates them on this issue
stems from the different realms of being in which they interested
themselves. Differences in method must inevitably distinguish those
such as Nietzsche who only exist in the sphere of ideas, and those like
the Nazis who try to turn radical ideals into reality. Action always
requires concessions from one's most ethereal dreams. Practicality
softens the rigid dogma which often accompanies an ideology in its
purest form. When Nietzsche says that "nationalism and protective
tariffs may appear sanctioned in the light" [of perpetuating stronger
types] (WP 386) he makes a rare appearance in the cold waters of
practicality. A t such times, his ideas tends to mirror the Nazis even
more. The project o f creating a higher human' type is a grandiose
one. The necessities of operating politically in the m odem world to
achieve grandiose ends confine one to a very narrow range of
political possibilities. Revolutionizing even one people's
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consciousness could not be accomplished in the free, artistically
liberal climate that Nietzsche advocated. In his rarer moments, he
acknowledged the necessary evil of conducting any experiment for a
higher type of man within the more controlled environment of a
nationalistic or socialistic society.
In fact, Nietzsche's dreams, stripped o f the luxury of their
idealism, bore many striking similarities to the visions of the Nazis.
The perfect human being, heroism, valor, glory, the warrior ethic,
the end of modernity, and cultural regeneration all look much
prettier between two covers in a book than they do when
encumbered by the imperfections of human action. Nietzsche seldom
stooped to incorporate banal human necessities into his visions of
human regeneration. Nietzsche barely skimmed the surface of
necessity and harsh reality in his writings, and for this very reason,
many of his tracts seem foreign to the grisly realities of the Third
Reich.
In Nietzsche's dreams, warriors do not need latrines. His
grand aesthetic spectacles do not include factories for the production
of rubber-soled boots. Nietzsche's Supermen fill their stomachs with
ambrosia, not with lean potato soup. His wars are fought with
swords forged in magma, not with tanks drowned in mud. In
reality, warriors kill people, masters enslave people, and rapacity
requires wailing, pathetic victims. Unbridled instincts result in
unimagined crimes. Had Nietzsche tempered his dreams with the
world as it existed around him and still chosen to embrace his own
values, his visions would have looked much more like Hitler's
realities.
This essay has addressed itself to the following question: If
forced to steep his dreams in the realities of modern, mechanized
conquest, just how different would Nietzsche's visions have been
from those of the Nazis? If shrouded in a gray tunic instead of a
coat of dazzling mail, are Nietzsche's idealizations of "conquest,
vendetta, revenge, ambition," and "the will to power" really so
different from those o f the Nazis? Such components o f Nietzsche's
master morality could not, under any circumstances, be realized
cleanly. Caught in a sea of barbed-wire, land-mines, and refugees,
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might necessity have moved Nietzsche to excuse the Nazis for their
socialism, nationalism, and their reliance on the state? T o the degree
that Nietzsche and his ilk were right in their criticisms o f modernity,
Hitler's profound immoralism and willingness to act were bound to
appear.
Evil
This leaves Nietzsche's famous advocacy of things "evil" as a
"final solution" to the modem malaise. W hat else could Nietzsche
have intended by statements such as "the great epochs of our life are
the occasions when we gain the courage to rebaptize our evil
qualities as our best qualities" (BGE 97)? When Nietzsche challenges
us all to get "beyond good and evil," he means that all o f our
impulses deserve a place in the natural order, even those drives now
deemed "evil." Only when we overcome all of our moral taboos can
life again become full.
The states in which w e infuse a transfiguration and
fullness into things and poeticize about them until they
reflect back our fullness and jo y in life: sexuality;
intoxication; feasting; spring; victory over an enemy,
mockery; bravado; cruelty; the ecstasy of religious
feeling. Three elements principally: sexuality,
intoxication, cruelty—all belonging to the oldest festal
jo y s of mankind (W P 421).
Nietzsche's image could easily be used to buttress any argument in
favor of paganism. Sensual indulgence is not just encouraged, it
anchors his ideal new world. Nietzsche clearly views the lust for
conquest as one of these natural human impulses. While indulging
the instincts may not seem a radical concept, the application of such
an idea would be revolutionary. Nietzsche is right to recognize that
the consequences for those unprepared for such people would indeed
be "evil." Nietzsche reminds his readers that the truths contained in
evil are hidden from those claiming to represent the "good" in the
modem world. "Everything that the good call evil must come
together so that one truth may be bom. O my brothers, are you evil
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enough for this truth? The audacious daring, the long mistrust, the
cruel No, the disgust, the cutting into the living—how rarely does all
this come together. But from such seed is truth begotten" (ZAR
312).
Ultimately, Nietzsche views the fear of evil as the very fear of
the fullness of life. Those feeble souls who say yes to perpetually
less of what they see will find evil under every stone and around
every comer. "The good man sees him self as if surrounded by evil,
and under the continual onslaught of evil his eye grows keener, he
discovers evil in all his dreams and desires; and so he ends, quite
reasonably, by considering nature evil, mankind corrupt, goodness
an act of grace. In summa, he denies life" (W P 193). Strong men,
on the contrary, see no evil. They see their opponents only in terms
of their relative strength. The strong view life as an eternal
competition. This is how Nietzsche ends The Will to Power: "This
world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves
are also this will to power—and nothing besides" (W P 550)! To say
that "I love Zarathustra for the sake of my evil spirit" (ZAR 409) is
to acknowledge Zarathustra's allure as an unexplored world o f
ignored wisdom, the wisdom of Zoroaster, the wisdom of ancient
pagan instinct, the wisdom o f bloodlust, and the wisdom of evil.
"We resist the idea that all great human beings have been
criminals (only in the grand and not in the miserable style), that
crime belongs to greatness" (W P 320). Armed with pure instinct,
Nietzsche's advocacy of evil, and the idea that crimes committed on a
grand scale may well constitute greatness, Hitler likely found
justification for his actions through Nietzsche. And not just for the
Holocaust. The revaluation of values is deemed a futuristic event at
times, but one of the utmost urgency at others. "The time has come
for man to set himself a goal . . . Alas, the time is coming when man
will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man, and the
string of his bow will have forgotten how to whir" (ZAR 129)!
Clearly, Nietzsche fears that the pacifistic herd animal o f the modem
world has no goal, only a "progressive" illusion, that will soon
render sterile the soil out of which higher goals can grow. Through
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such prophesies, Hitler received the blessing o f a great mind to act
not ju st with great "evil," but to act quickly as well.
The new will to power shall not be a search for an equal place
in the family o f nations. "It is quite in order that we possess no
religion o f oppressed Aryan races, for that is a contradiction: a
master race is either on top or it is destroyed" (W P 93). The will to
power should not be interpreted simply as the maniacal quest of one
individual over others. "All great men want to imbed themselves in
great communities; they want to give a single form to the
multifarious and disordered; chaos stimulates them . . . To gain that
tremendous energy of greatness in order to shape the man of the
future through breeding and, on the other hand, the annihilation of
millions of failures, and not to perish of the suffering one creates,
though nothing like it has ever existed" (WP 506)! The great
community shall be constituted o f the superior in every way, the
dominant, the born master. "Among men too a hot sun hatches a
beautiful breed. And there are many wonderful things in those who
are evil" (ZAR 255). No one who reads Nietzsche should believe
that all this "evil" is perpetuated to no end. Nietzsche's desired ends
are demonstrated from his first work of The Birth o f Tragedy right
through The Will to Power. "The profound poet tells us that a man
who is truly noble is incapable of sin; though every law, every
natural order, indeed the entire canon of ethics, perish by his actions,
those very actions will create a circle of higher consequences able to
found a new world on the ruins of the old" (BT 60).
Hitler also wished to found a new world on the ruins of the
old. The hidden value to destruction is the necessity of renewal. To
give purpose to his destruction and rebirth, Hitler necessarily
followed Nietzsche's example o f "advocated taking exceedingly tough
steps against the agents of degeneration."1 Eradicating the herd
animal, its shepherds, and the slavish ethics of Christianity mandated
taking many o f the "tough steps" for which Hitler is now famous.
And no one could envision him self more qualified for the "artistic
refashioning o f mankind" than Hitler. The frustrated artist finally
1Steven E. Aschheim, "Nordau, Nietzsche, and Regeneration," 652.
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found his niche on a grand, pre-ordained scale. Hitler would be the artist of Europe's post-decadent society. The SS would be
Nietzsche's cruel, pitiless, dazzling warriors. Through
totalitarianism, Hitler sought to create Nietzsche's single will by
means of a new caste dominating all Europe, with a "protracted,
terrible will of its own which could set its objectives thousands of
years ahead" (BGE 138). Therein lay Hitler's Thousand Year Reich.
To replace Nietzsche's "mixed race man, on the whole a smallsouled man," (BGE 121) Hitler wished to repopulate the east with
blond-haired, blue-eyed couples who were spiritually outfitted for
mastery and conquest. T o replace the tamed, Christian herd animals
of Nietzsche's chagrin, Hitler planned a homogenized officer corps,
but one capable of unbridled will, savagery, and predatory acts of
cruelty. The officer of the Reich was supposed to embody the
discipline, single-mindedness, rapaciousness, and keen intellect of the
Overman. The Third Reich came prematurely and far less
beautifully than Nietzsche would have liked to imagine. Still,
Nietzsche clearly provided the vivid images resulting in Hitler's alltoo concrete spectacles.
rrveviKofO
'
In Mein Kampf, Hitler never mentionecfNietzsche. This
w 'P&SSiwq 1
conspicuous omission, along with the infamously poor writing of
Mein Kampf \ suggest that Hitler seldom if ever consciously imitated
Nietzsche. Y et many of Hitler's dreams for the regeneration o f the
German people echoed Nietzsche's dreams for the regeneration of
Western Culture. Despite his assertion that the Germans constitute
the heartland of the master race, Hitler criticized the Germans in
many of the same ways that Nietzsche did. He also spurred them to
move forward in Nietzschean terms. Hitler condemned the Germans
for their "inner decay," which "had remained hidden and invisible to
the eyes of most people, or which like ostriches people did not want
to see."2 On these grounds, they deserved to lose W orld W ar I.
Controlled by the "bourgeois voting cattle" of the parliamentary
system, the Germans had allowed their "spiritual backbone" to

2Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 229-230.
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soften.3 Nietzsche agreed with all o f these observations about the
state of German culture.
To "conserve" the nation for the coming conflict, at once a
grand Nietzschean revenge for the Germans and a revaluation of
their values, Hitler wished to enliven the Volk in the mean time.
Hitler, like Nietzsche, would have been impressed with any nation
whose virtues came close to the ancient Greeks. "What makes the
Greek ideal of beauty a model is the wonderful combination of the
most magnificent physical beauty, with a brilliant mind and the
noblest soul."4 These were Hitler's words, not Nietzsche's. In Mein
Kampf, Hitler makes clear his passion for the eventual, grand
cultivation of the German intellect. Unlike Nietzsche, Hitler's goals
did not permit him to await the perfect combination of
circumstances. As he lived much more in the world o f action than
did Nietzsche, Hitler could not wait millenia for the cultivation of a
Nietzschean race of supra-intellectual aristocratic-warriors.
Unlike Nietzsche, Hitler had to wage war first, and
appropriate resources for the cultivation of perfect human beings, if
at all, later. "First struggle and then we shall see what can be done.
Otherwise mankind has passed the high point of its development and
the end is not the domination o f any ethical idea but barbarism and
consequently chaos."5 Hitler, like Nietzsche, imagined utopias free
of unbridled barbarism and graced by perfectly aesthetic and
cultivated human beings. But the modem world provided a hostile
reception for the "revaluation of values" in a Nietzschean, or
Hitlerian fashion. Struggle against the modern world, the most
powerful force created in human history, had to come immediately
and with full force or it would never come. Consequently, Hitler's
legions and workers went into the field of battle against the modem
world with only a w hiff of the cultivation required for a super-race.
With a hint of pitiless barbarism, Hitler's Germany rose to the
challenge of destroying Western ethical conceptions as Nietzsche

3Ibid, 341.
4Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 408.
5Ibid., 288.
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portrayed them. But munitions factories, shipyards, potato fields,
coal mines, steel mills, and even the autobahn would not have suited
Nietzsche's dreams for the aesthetic achievements of the Superman.
Nationalism, socialism, anti-Semitism, and the ruinous tactics of the
Nazis lacked all of the beauty of Nietzsche's prose. The nascent state
of the German revolt against the modem world could not conform to
Nietzsche's high aesthetic, intellectual, or spiritual expectations.
Like a W agnerian opera, the Germans' battle against the modern
world never hinted of Nietzsche's more subtle and eternal truths.
Y et uncoordinated though their performance may have been, the
Nazis' nascent experiment took its inspiration from Nietzsche. In a
plethora of ways, they learned what to oppose in the modem world
through him. And, common to the relationship between master and
pupil, Nietzsche and the Nazis were separated more by skill,
development, and genius than by their goals for the future of the
world.
Tw o vital distinctions emerge from this research. One, some
context and substance has been added to the debate that never was,
but perhaps still can be. Two, it should now be clear that the
similarities and dissimilarities between Nietzsche and the Nazis are
not bland and accidental, but quite striking. W here they differ
ideologically, huge chasms seem to emerge. W here they share
ground, they occupy a hidden valley of thought into which few
others have even peeked. Given this odd juxtaposition of facts, one
can easily see how scholars could focus on one very evident side o f
the issue or the other and form very rigid opinions. To avoid this, a
very nuanced, balanced, and sober approach to the topic of Nietzsche
and the Nazis is required.
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